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INTRODUCTION
A corrosive concept has infected the roots of our democracy. This insidious notion,
which has eluded judicial grasp, is that legislators may constitutionally draw electoral
districts for the purpose of securing their own victory (“incumbency advantage”) or
the victory of their party (“political advantage”). Political gerrymandering is popularly
* Gary Michael Parsons, Jr., J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2013; A.B.,
Davidson College, 2008.
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perceived as being disreputable but legal.1 This is only half-true. The Supreme Court
has explicitly recognized that political gerrymandering may offend constitutional
principles. Unfortunately, it has failed to articulate when this is the case and why.2
This Article seeks to answer those questions.
A careful reading of Supreme Court precedent exposes that electoral advantage
is not a legitimate state interest. Those who claim legal cover to pursue political gain
through the redistricting process have ignored three critical distinctions. These conceptual snares have spawned a set of false premises that this Article aims to elucidate
and dispel: (1) the assumption that legislators’ personal considerations are synonymous
with the legislature’s state interests; (2) the assumption that the constitutionality of
political gerrymandering turns on the degree of “political interest” sought rather
than the type of “political interest” sought; and (3) the assumption that there is one
political gerrymandering offense rather than two: dilution and sorting.
This Article canvasses the history of redistricting case law and provides precedential authority for judges and litigants alike to identify and uproot the nettlesome
notions that have plagued political gerrymandering claims to date. Naming these
misconceptions points a way out of the wilderness and cuts a clear course through the
political thicket. The Article proceeds as follows: Part I surveys the background and
current state of redistricting law; Part II explores the analytical pitfalls that have
plagued political gerrymandering claims to date; and Part III proposes a path for pursuing such claims going forward.
I. BACKGROUND
Since 1886, the Supreme Court has recognized the right to vote as “fundamental” under the Constitution because it is “preservative of all rights.”3 A democracy
1

See Laura Vozzella, Va. House Map Constitutional, Federal Judges Rule, WASH. POST
(Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/va-house-map-con
stitutional-federal-judges-rule/2015/10/22/4dccbaf8-78ff-11e5-b9c1-f03c48c96ac2
_story.html [https://perma.cc/AWA2-JYCQ] (“The court had a choice between whether these
districts are racially gerrymandered or politically gerrymandered . . . . The court chose [to
rule that] this was a political gerrymander, which while completely damaging to our democracy,
is completely legal.” (quoting Brian Cannon, Executive Director of OneVirginia2021 (second
alteration in original))) (discussing the decision in Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
No. 3:14CV852, 2015 WL 6440332 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2015), cert. docketed, No. 15-680,
84 USLW 3305 (Nov. 20, 2015)); see also Harris v. McCrory, No. 1:13-CV-49, 2016 WL
482052, at *21, 23 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2016) (Cogburn, J., concurring) (expressing “concerns
about how unfettered gerrymandering is negatively impacting our republican form of government,” but lamenting, without citation, that “redistricting to protect the party that controls
the state legislature is constitutionally permitted and lawful”).
2
See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 n.7 (1999) [hereinafter Cromartie I]
(“This Court has recognized . . . that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable under
the Equal Protection Clause although we [are] not in agreement as to the standards that would
govern such a claim.”).
3
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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without a fair and functional electoral system is a democracy in name only. Therefore,
a state’s “denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection,”4
even if the denial of rights comes in the form of redistricting legislation and judicial
protection risks drawing the courts into the “political thicket.”5
The Court has recognized at least three ways in which redistricting legislation risks
abridging constitutional rights in a manner amenable to judicial review: (1) numerical
vote dilution in violation of the one person, one vote principle; (2) racial gerrymandering; and (3) political gerrymandering.
A. One Person, One Vote
In Gray v. Sanders,6 the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a Georgia
“county unit” voting system that gave “every qualified voter one vote in a statewide
election,” but “weigh[ed] the rural vote more heavily than the urban vote and weigh[ed]
some small rural counties heavier than other larger rural counties.”7 “One unit vote
in Echols County represented 938 residents, whereas one unit vote in Fulton County
represented 92,721 residents. Thus, one resident in Echols County had an influence
in the nomination of candidates equivalent to 99 residents of Fulton County.”8
The Supreme Court recognized that “every voter is equal to every other voter . . .
when he casts his ballot” and that “[t]he concept of ‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the
basic qualifications.”9 As the Court stated: “The conception of political equality from
the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person,
one vote.”10
As the Court would more fully explain in later cases, “The right to vote freely
for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.”11 Because
“the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a
citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise,” the state cannot allow some legislators to be elected by a substantially
different number of voters than other legislators.12 Doing so accords voters’ ballots
different numerical weight based merely on where those voters reside and implicates
the state in quantitative vote dilution.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
Id.
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 379–80.
Id. at 381.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
Id.
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The modern “one person, one vote” (OPOV) principle is derived from two separate constitutional provisions. In congressional elections, voters are protected by
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, which commands that Representatives be
chosen “by the People of the several States.”13 This provision, “construed in its historical context, . . . means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”14 In state legislative elections,
voters are protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15
As the Supreme Court held in Reynolds v. Sims:
[T]he concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed
as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the
same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged. With respect to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same relation
regardless of where they live. Any suggested criteria for the differentiation of citizens are insufficient to justify any discrimination,
as to the weight of their votes, unless relevant to the permissible
purposes of legislative apportionment. Since the achieving of
fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the
basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude that the
Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal
participation by all voters in the election of state legislators.16
Although the Equal Protection Clause still requires that “a State make an honest and
good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of
equal population as is practicable,”17 the Supreme Court has long recognized a “dichotomy”18 between the stringent equal population requirement of Article I and the
“broader latitude” afforded to state legislative redistricting under the Equal Protection Clause.19
1. Congressional Districts
Under Article I, “the ‘as nearly as practicable’ standard requires that the State
make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality.”20 This standard
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (footnote omitted).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565–66.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565–66.
See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324–25 (1973) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577).
Id. at 322.
Id. at 324–25.
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969) (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577).
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requires that the state strive for precise mathematical equality, but does not demand
that the state attain precise mathematical equality.21 “Any number of consistently
applied legislative policies might justify some variance, including, for instance, making
districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior
districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives.”22 So long as
the state’s objective is “legitimate” and its criteria are “nondiscriminatory” and “consistently applied,” the state may be able to justify minor deviations from precise
mathematical equality.23
Whether a state’s congressional redistricting plan can meet this standard is
evaluated under a two-prong test.24 “First, the parties challenging the plan bear the
burden of proving the existence of population differences that ‘could practicably be
avoided.’”25 Second, if the plaintiffs make this showing, then “the burden shifts to
the State to ‘show with some specificity’ that the population differences ‘were necessary to achieve some legitimate state objective.’”26 The state’s burden under this
second step “is a ‘flexible’ one, which ‘depend[s] on the size of the deviations, the
importance of the State’s interests, the consistency with which the plan as a whole
reflects those interests, and the availability of alternatives that might substantially
vindicate those interests yet approximate population equality more closely.’”27 For
example, if an alleged “state interest” is applied in an ad hoc or discriminatory manner,
rather than a consistent manner, this may reveal that the state’s proclaimed interest
is a “subterfuge” that cannot support the population deviations in question.28
2. State Legislative Districts
The Equal Protection Clause “requires both houses of a bicameral state legislature
to be apportioned substantially on a population basis.”29 Although states must still
“make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable,”30 the implementation of the
OPOV principle is more flexible in state legislative redistricting.31 This is because the
21

Id.
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).
23
Id.
24
See Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 3, 4 (2012) (per curiam) (noting the
two-prong test set out by the Karcher Court).
25
Id. at 5 (quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 734).
26
Id. (quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 741).
27
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 741).
28
See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 535 (1969) (“Findings as to population
trends must be thoroughly documented and applied throughout the State in a systematic, not
an ad hoc, manner.”).
29
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321 (1973).
30
Id. at 324–25 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964)).
31
Id. at 321 (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533) (noting that the Court in Reynolds held
22
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application of an “‘absolute equality’ test” to state legislative redistricting “may impair
the normal functioning of state and local governments.”32 Moreover, “[i]ndiscriminate
[state legislative] districting, without any regard for political subdivision or natural or
historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering.”33 As such, “[s]o long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational
state policy, some deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible.”34
Whether a state legislative redistricting plan complies with the Equal Protection
Clause is also evaluated under a “step test,” but the Supreme Court has alternated
between formulations that posit the test as a “two-step” test or a “three-step” test.35
Under any formulation, however, the first step evaluates the size of the plan’s total
population deviation.36 If the plan’s total population deviation exceeds 10%, then
this creates a prima facie case of discrimination, which must be justified by the
state.37 If the plan’s total population deviation is below 10%, then the plaintiff bears
the burden of showing some evidence of “invidiousness.”38 In other words, the plaintiff must present some evidence that the state’s interest was illegitimate or that the
state’s criteria were discriminatory or inconsistently applied.39
Once the initial burden-shifting step is complete, the second step evaluates
“[t]he consistency of application and the neutrality of effect of the nonpopulation criteria . . . along with the size of the population disparities [to] determin[e] whether
[the] state legislative apportionment plan contravenes the Equal Protection Clause.”40
In other formulations, the Supreme Court has broken this evaluation into two distinct
stages. Under this approach, the state first bears the burden of showing that the
“more flexibility was constitutionally permissible with respect to state legislative reapportionment than in congressional redistricting” (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578)).
32
Id. at 323 (referencing the absolute equality test from Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. 526, and
Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969)).
33
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578–79.
34
Mahan, 410 U.S. at 324–25 (alteration in original) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579)
(reaffirming the conclusion reached by the Reynolds Court).
35
See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–46 (1983). In still other formulations, the
test has been viewed as involving four steps. See id. at 852 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36
See id. at 842–43 (majority opinion); see also id. at 852 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37
Id. at 842–43 (majority opinion).
38
See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 743–45 (1973) (noting that “minor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make out
a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require
justification by the State”); Brown, 462 U.S. at 842 (noting that “as a general matter, . . . an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within this category
of minor deviations”).
39
See Brown, 462 U.S. at 844–46.
40
Id. at 845–46.
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population deviations were “the result of the consistent and nondiscriminatory application of a legitimate state policy”41 (or, that its criteria were employed “free from any
taint of arbitrariness or discrimination”).42 For example, a population deviation may
not be employed to “[d]iscriminat[e] against a class of individuals[ ] merely because of
the nature of their employment.”43 Next,44 the question becomes “whether the
population disparities among the districts that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan
exceed constitutional limits.”45 This is because “a State’s policy urged in justification of disparity in district population, however rational, cannot constitutionally
be permitted to emasculate the goal of substantial equality.”46 If the goal of population
equality “is submerged as the controlling consideration in the apportionment of seats
in the particular legislative body, then the right of all of the State’s citizens to cast an
effective and adequately weighted vote would be unconstitutionally impaired.”47 A total
population deviation of 16.4%, for example, “may well approach tolerable limits.”48
B. Racial Gerrymandering
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits legislatures from engaging in two forms of
racial gerrymandering: intentional racial vote dilution (under the Bolden-Rogers line of
cases)49 and racial sorting (under the Shaw-Miller line of cases).50 Additionally, the Voting Rights Act (VRA)51 statutorily prohibits redistricting legislation that results in
racial vote dilution (regardless of intent) or, in some jurisdictions, redistricting legislation that causes a retrogression in minority voters’ ability to elect their preferred
candidate of choice.52
41

Id. at 844.
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
43
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 691 (1964).
44
Justice Brennan’s four-step formulation would interpose an extra tailoring step here,
requiring the State to show that any deviations attributed to the State’s asserted policy “are
not significantly greater than is necessary to serve the . . . policy.” Brown, 462 U.S. at 852
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
45
Id. at 843 (majority opinion) (quoting Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328 (1973)).
46
Mahan, 410 U.S. at 326.
47
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964).
48
Mahan, 410 U.S. at 329.
49
See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
50
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) [hereinafter Shaw I].
51
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended
at scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.)
52
In Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), the Court held the jurisdictional
coverage formula unconstitutional, thereby suspending the application of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act until Congress enacts a new coverage formula. Id. at 2631.
42
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1. Fourteenth Amendment Intentional Racial Vote Dilution
After establishing the OPOV principle and holding quantitative vote dilution
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court was soon faced with “the other half of Reynolds
v. Sims”: whether gerrymandering resulting in qualitative vote dilution could be
considered constitutionally impermissible.53 In a qualitative vote dilution claim, the
state accords each vote approximately equal numerical weight, but renders a group
of voters electorally weak by “cracking” the group apart between districts (to render
a large group of voters an ineffective minority in each district) or by “packing” the
group into as few districts as possible (to pile up the group’s supporters redundantly
and to prevent them from having any effective influence in adjacent districts).54
When the targeted group consists of voters in a racial minority, the practice constitutes racial vote dilution and is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.55
In the Court’s early racial vote dilution cases, it expressed concern about categorically barring districting devices—such as multi-member districts—that were not
“inherently invidious.”56 The Court was also troubled about looking solely to proportionate electoral outcomes to gauge whether vote dilution had occurred.57
In Fortson v. Dorsey,58 the Court first observed that a “constituency apportionment scheme” may not “comport with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause”
if it “designedly or otherwise . . . would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.”59 Over the next
several years, the Court struggled with how to analyze the issue and draw the line
between unconstitutional vote dilution and the commonplace loss of elections.60
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, for example, the Court acknowledged that racial vote
dilution presented a cognizable offense, but also noted that the Court “ha[d] not yet
sustained such an attack.”61 In Whitcomb, the Court observed:
[T]he failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to
its population emerges more as a function of losing elections than
of built-in bias against poor Negroes. The voting power of ghetto
53

Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 176–77 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The “qualitative”/“quantitative” nomenclature is borrowed from DANIEL
P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 45 (2013). It should be noted, however, that quantitative dilution can target racial and political groups as well.
54
See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 670 (White, J., dissenting).
55
See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
56
See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 159–60.
57
Id. at 144–46.
58
379 U.S. 433 (1965).
59
Id. at 438–39.
60
See infra notes 61–74 and accompanying text.
61
Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 144.
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residents may have been “cancelled out” as the District Court held,
but this seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls.62
Unable to identify any distinction between these phenomena, the Court was “unprepared to hold that district-based elections decided by plurality vote are unconstitutional
in either single- or multi-member districts simply because the supporters of losing
candidates have no legislative seats assigned to them.”63
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Douglas observed
the importance of determining “whether a gerrymander can be ‘constitutionally
impermissible’”64:
The question of the gerrymander is the other half of Reynolds v.
Sims. Fair representation of voters in a legislative assembly—
one man, one vote—would seem to require (1) substantial equality
of population within each district and (2) the avoidance of district lines that weigh the power of one race more heavily than
another. The latter can be done—and is done—by astute drawing
of district lines that makes the district either heavily Democratic or
heavily Republican as the case may be. Lines may be drawn so
as to make the voice of one racial group weak or strong, as the
case may be.
The problem of the gerrymander is how to defeat or circumvent the sentiments of the community. The problem of the law
is how to prevent it.65
Two years later, the Court found its answer and struck down a multi-member
districting scheme in White v. Regester.66 Rather than looking to proportional electoral outcomes, the Court looked to whether the scheme interfered with equal
electoral opportunities:
To sustain such claims, it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiffs’ burden is to produce
evidence to support findings that the political processes leading
62

Id. at 153.
Id. at 160.
64
Id. at 176 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Wells v.
Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 544 (1969); Dorsey, 379 U.S. at 439).
65
Id. at 176–77 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
66
412 U.S. 755 (1973).
63
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to nomination and election were not equally open to participation
by the group in question—that its members had less opportunity
than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.67
Although the Court did not specify at the time whether it was necessary to prove
discriminatory purpose in addition to discriminatory effect, the Court finally upheld
a racial vote dilution challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.68
Eventually, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, the Court indicated in a plurality opinion
that both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect were required to establish
a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution.69 This requirement was confirmed
by a majority of the Court in Rogers v. Lodge.70 There, Justice White wrote that “a
showing of discriminatory intent has long been required in all types of equal protection cases charging racial discrimination.”71 The Court reiterated its prior position
that multi-member districts are not unconstitutional per se, notwithstanding that they
may cause a “distinct minority, whether it be a racial, ethnic, economic, or political
group” to be unable to elect their chosen representatives.72 Although “[t]he minority’s voting power . . . is particularly diluted when bloc voting occurs and ballots are
cast along strict majority-minority lines,”73 such results do not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment if they cannot be traced to a discriminatory purpose.74
Following the plurality opinion in Bolden, Congress sought to update the VRA
and amend Section 2 to create a statutory cause of action whenever, “based on the
totality of circumstances,” a challenged practice gave racial minorities “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice.”75 By enacting Regester’s “discriminatory
effect” language and omitting any discriminatory purpose requirement, Congress
created a statutory “results test” that could be used by plaintiffs who might not
otherwise be able to proceed pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted
in Rogers.76 As a result of the legislative compromise necessary to pass the 1982
67

Id. at 765–66 (emphasis added).
See generally id.
69
446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
70
458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982).
71
Id. (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)).
72
Id. at 616.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 616–17.
75
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
76
See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (“In 1982, [Congress] amended § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act to prohibit legislation that results in the dilution of a minority group’s voting strength,
regardless of the legislature’s intent.”).
68
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amendment, the section also included a proviso, stating “[t]hat nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population.”77 This language was meant to ensure that the
legislation’s focus on equal electoral opportunities did not evolve into a requirement
to achieve proportional electoral outcomes.78
Because the VRA created a statutory cause of action with a lower threshold than
the Fourteenth Amendment itself, the constitutional claim of intentional racial vote
dilution has been rendered largely dormant.79 Yet, this constitutional claim does still
exist and may, in fact, incorporate aspects of the Court’s Section 2 “results test” case
law for analyzing discriminatory effect.80
2. Fourteenth Amendment Racial Sorting
The other form of racial gerrymandering prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment
is “racial sorting.” A racial sorting claim is “analytically distinct” from an intentional
vote dilution claim.81
Whereas a vote dilution claim alleges that the State has enacted
a particular voting scheme as a purposeful device “to minimize
or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities,”
an action disadvantaging voters of a particular race, the essence
of . . . [a racial sorting claim] is that the State has used race as a
basis for separating voters into districts.82
The theory of harm advanced in racial sorting cases is that the State has imposed
“expressive” and “representational” harms on individual citizens by sorting them
between districts based on suspect criteria.83 In Shaw I, the Court held that “[c]lassifications of citizens solely on the basis of race ‘are by their very nature odious to a
77

52 U.S.C. § 10301.
See S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 11–12 (2006).
79
See Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act to Communities Containing Two
or More Minority Groups—When Is the Whole Greater Than the Sum of the Parts?, 20 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 95, 102 (1989) (noting that courts often decline to review constitutional claims
of vote dilution and instead decide cases under the Voting Rights Act).
80
See Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“We maintain that,
even though Gingles did not involve an equal protection claim, the three factors were derived
by the Court from the principles set forth in the vote dilution cases brought under the Equal
Protection Clause. We therefore conclude that the three preconditions have always been and
remain elements of constitutional vote dilution claims.”).
81
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 652).
82
Id. (citation omitted).
83
See id. at 911–13 (citing Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647; Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78
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free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’ They threaten
to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to
incite racial hostility.”84 Such “classifications” constitute “expressive” harms.
State classifications of this nature also threaten “representational” harms:
The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. When a district obviously is created
solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial
group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary
obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather
than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical
to our system of representative democracy.85
Thus, racial gerrymandering—even for remedial purposes—threatens to “balkanize”
citizens into competing factions.86 These harms are personal and suffered by individuals within the violative districts.87
Just because a legislature may be aware of its citizens’ race when districting
does not “lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination.”88 In redistricting,
a legislature “always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware
of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other
demographic factors.”89 However, when a district subordinates traditional, neutral
districting conventions to racial considerations and race becomes the predominant
basis upon which voters are placed “within or without a particular district,” then the
redistricting legislation is the legal equivalent of a facially discriminatory classification and the Fourteenth Amendment demands justification.90
Like any other law that includes a suspect facial classification, redistricting legislation that reflects subordination to racial considerations on its face must advance a
compelling interest by narrowly tailored means.91 Thus, the state must show a
“strong basis in evidence” that it was “cur[ing] the effects of past discrimination,”92
or that such race-based districting was required under a constitutional reading of
84

Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 643 (citations omitted) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
85
Id. at 648.
86
Id. at 657.
87
United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995) (“Voters in [racially sorted] districts may
suffer the special representational harms racial classifications can cause in the voting context.”).
88
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646.
89
Id.
90
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
91
Id. at 920 (“To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must demonstrate that its districting
legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.”).
92
Id. at 922.
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federal law.93 In tailoring to the latter interest, a state cannot go “beyond what was
reasonably necessary to avoid” a violation of the VRA.94 For example, a state cannot
avoid vote dilution in one part of the state by drawing a performing minority district
in another part of the state.95
Thus, the Shaw-Miller line of racial sorting cases is “analytically distinct” from
the Bolden-Rogers line of intentional racial vote dilution cases because it employs
the Court’s suspect facial classification jurisprudence rather than its traditional
intent-plus-effect jurisprudence.96 In addition to complying with these dual constitutional commands, state legislators drafting redistricting legislation must also comply
with the federal statutory requirements of the VRA.
3. The Voting Rights Act
“The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial
discrimination in voting,”97 and prohibits two different redistricting offenses: dilution and retrogression.
a. Section 2: Non-Dilution Standard
Section 2 of the VRA bars states from adopting redistricting legislation that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of
race or color.”98 In 1982, Congress incorporated the Supreme Court’s language from
Regester into the statute, which made it a Section 2 violation when a redistricting
plan results in minority voters “hav[ing] less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.”99 In other words, Congress “amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to prohibit legislation that results in the dilution of a minority group’s voting strength,
regardless of the legislature’s intent.”100
For a plan to constitute a Section 2 violation, “a bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically
93

Id. at 921.
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 655.
95
See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 917 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw II]. A “performing minority district,” for purposes of the VRA, is one in which minority voters possess the ability
to elect the candidate of their choice. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1322
(S.D. Fla. 2002).
96
See Miller, 515 U.S. at 911–14.
97
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty.
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
98
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012).
99
Id. § 10301(b).
100
Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993).
94

1120

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:1107

insular minority group.”101 Thus, plaintiffs must satisfy the three prerequisites set out
in Thornburg v. Gingles before the Court can find a violation based on the totality
of circumstances.102 “First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a [numerical] majority
in a single-member district.”103 “Second, the minority group must be able to show
that it is politically cohesive.”104 “Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate
that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of
special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed—usually
to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”105 If the plaintiffs demonstrate the
existence of all three Gingles prerequisites, then the court evaluates the evidence
based on the totality of circumstances.106
Therefore, states aiming to comply with Section 2 of the VRA must look to their
demographics and determine where minority groups are sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a numerical majority in a hypothetical district.107 In
these areas, the state must ensure that minority voters maintain an “equal opportunity”
to “elect representatives of their choice.”108 It should be noted, however, that nothing
in the VRA would seem to require states to create “majority-minority” districts (i.e., districts where minority voters represent more than 50% of the voting population). In
Bartlett v. Strickland, the Supreme Court held that Section 2 requires the creation of a
performing minority district wherever minority voters would constitute a numerical majority in a hypothetical district.109 But Strickland’s observation that “§ 2 can require the
creation of [majority-minority] districts” only meant that when a reasonably compact
group of minority voters would constitute a numerical majority in a hypothetical
district, Section 2 would require the creation of a performing “ability-to-elect” district as a remedy.110
Although a district may need to be a majority-minority district in order to retain
the ability to elect where racial polarization is stark, Strickland need not—and,
indeed, should not—be read to require the creation of majority-minority districts

101

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48–49 (1986).
Id. at 46, 50.
103
Id. at 50; see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13 (2009) (establishing numerical
majority requirement).
104
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.
105
Id. (citation omitted).
106
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013–14 (1994).
107
See Strickland, 556 U.S. at 13.
108
De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1026 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that “§ 2’s command
[is] that minority voters be given equal opportunity to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice”).
109
Strickland, 556 U.S. at 25–26.
110
See id. at 13.
102
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wherever minorities would constitute a hypothetical numerical majority. Where
white crossover voting emerges, minority voters maintain their equal ability to elect
even when they do not constitute a numerical majority.111 Moreover, if white crossover
voting is present, plaintiffs would be hard-pressed to satisfy the Gingles prerequisite
of “white bloc voting” in the first place.112 This reading allows the threshold necessary to satisfy the VRA to decrease over time as racial polarization dissipates. In
other words, the stringency of the VRA’s prophylactic requirements becomes directly
correlated with the demonstrable, continuing need for those requirements, thereby
avoiding constitutional concern with the VRA itself.
b. Section 5: Non-Retrogression Standard
Section 5 of the VRA, on the other hand, prohibits “voting changes with ‘any
discriminatory purpose’ as well as voting changes that diminish the ability of [minority] citizens . . . ‘to elect their preferred candidates of choice.’”113 In other words,
Section 5 is focused on “proposed changes in voting procedures” and prohibits those
changes that “would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”114 Unlike Section 2,
which applies to jurisdictions nationwide and prohibits redistricting legislation that
submerges minority voters’ ability to elect in areas where they would constitute a
numerical majority, Section 5 applies only to specific jurisdictions specified by
Congress in the VRA115 and prohibits redistricting legislation that submerges minority voters’ ability to elect below that provided by the existing, or “benchmark,”
redistricting plan.116
Thus, Section 5 requires the state to look to those areas where minority voters’
ability to elect is currently reflected in the benchmark plan—including both
111

Id. at 23–24 (“Our holding that § 2 does not require [the State to create] crossover
districts does not consider the permissibility of such districts as a matter of legislative choice
or discretion. . . . Much like § 5, § 2 allows States to choose their own method of complying
with the Voting Rights Act, and we have said that may include drawing crossover districts.”).
112
Id. at 16.
113
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013) (quoting Voting Rights Act of
1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b)–(d) (2012) (now codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304)).
114
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883 (1994) (emphasis added) (quoting Beer v. United
States, 425 U.S. 130, 138, 141 (1976)).
115
The coverage formula provided in Section 4 has been ruled unconstitutional, thereby
suspending the application of Section 5 until Congress enacts a new coverage formula. See
Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
116
Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 478 (1997) (“Retrogression, by definition,
requires a comparison of a jurisdiction’s new voting plan with its existing plan. It also necessarily implies that the jurisdiction’s existing plan is the benchmark against which the ‘effect’
of voting changes is measured.” (citation omitted)).
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majority-minority districts and crossover districts117—to ensure that the proposed
redistricting legislation does not diminish minority voters’ ability to elect relative
to that benchmark.118 As with Section 2, nothing in Section 5 specifically requires that
performing “ability-to-elect” districts be “majority-minority” districts.119 If a state
replaces an existing majority-minority district with a performing crossover district
(or maintains an existing crossover district as an effective crossover district), then
there would be no reduction in voters’ ability to elect and no retrogression in the
effective exercise of their electoral franchise.120
117

See Strickland, 556 U.S. at 13 (“[A] crossover district is one in which minority voters
make up less than a majority of the voting-age population . . . [but are] large enough [in
population] to elect the candidate of [their] choice with help from voters who are members
of the majority . . . .”).
118
Both “majority-minority” and “crossover” ability to elect must be protected to ensure
that a redistricting plan does not result in retrogression. This is for several reasons. First,
Congress’s 2006 VRA amendments rejected the majority opinion in Georgia v. Aschroft, 539
U.S. 461 (2003), and adopted the dissent of Justice Souter. See Ala. Legislative Black
Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273 (2015) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 68–69
& n.183 (2006)). Although Justice Souter found the substitution of “influence” districts too
“unmoored” from the ability-to-elect standard in his Ashcroft dissent, he found crossover
districts to constitute performing ability-to-elect districts. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 493–94
(Souter, J., dissenting). Second, the House Report to the 2006 amendments specifically endorsed this view. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 71 (“Voting changes that leave a minority
group less able to elect a preferred candidate of choice, either directly or when coalesced
with other voters, cannot be precleared under Section 5.” (emphasis added)). Third, the
Senate Report, which endorsed a contrary view, did not provide the same persuasive insights
into legislative intent as the House Report. See S. REP. NO. 109-295 (2006). The Senate
Report to the 2006 amendments marked the first time in American history that “a Senate
committee that unanimously voted in favor of a law later published a postenactment
committee report that was supported only by members of one party.” Nathaniel Persily, The
Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 178 (2007). In the
post-enactment Senate Report, the minority party emphasized, “We object and do not
subscribe to this Committee Report . . . which . . . has become a very different document than
the draft Report circulated by the Chairman on July 24, 2006.” S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 54.
Fourth, a reading of Section 5 that would only protect majority-minority districts would come
close to conflating the protections of Section 2 and Section 5 in violation of basic principles
of statutory interpretation.
119
See Strickland, 556 U.S. at 23–24 (“Our holding that § 2 does not require [the State to
create] crossover districts does not consider the permissibility of such districts as a matter
of legislative choice or discretion. . . . Much like § 5, § 2 allows States to choose their own
method of complying with the Voting Rights Act, and we have said that may include drawing
crossover districts.”).
120
Of course, districts must be redrawn to comply with the OPOV principle. If “maintaining”
the ability to elect in a new district would require the substantial disregard of neutral districting
principles or would require deviation from OPOV principles, then it cannot truly be said that
a protectable ability-to-elect interest presently exists in the benchmark plan. Non-retrogression
does not require that an enacted plan possess the exact same number of ability-to-elect districts
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C. Political Gerrymandering
The Fourteenth Amendment also limits legislatures’ ability to engage in political
gerrymandering. Racial and political gerrymandering claims share a common judicial
genesis in Fortson v. Dorsey, where the Supreme Court first stated that a “constituency
apportionment scheme” may not “comport with the dictates of the Equal Protection
Clause” if it “designedly or otherwise . . . would operate to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.”121 Following this foray into policing qualitative vote dilution, the Supreme Court considered
racial and political gerrymandering to be offenses of the same species for over twenty
years.122 For example, in Whitcomb, the Court recognized that any rule of law preventing the invidious dilution of a racial minority’s right to vote would be equally
applicable to the invidious dilution of a political minority’s right to vote.123 Similarly, both the majority and dissent in Rogers—which cemented the modern “intentplus-effect” intentional vote dilution test—understood political vote dilution to fall
within the same category as racial vote dilution.124
as the benchmark plan. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 492 (Souter, J., dissenting). Any other
reading of retrogression would require districters to ignore changing demographic realities.
121
379 U.S. 433, 438–39 (1965) (emphasis added).
122
See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182,
184 n.2 (1971); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 (1970); Burns v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
123
See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 156 (noting that recognizing a racial vote dilution claim
would “make it difficult to reject claims of Democrats, Republicans, or members of any
political organization in Marion County who live in what would be safe districts in a singlemember district system but who in one year or another, or year after year, are submerged in
a one-sided multi-member district vote”).
124
See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616–17 (1982) (“At-large voting schemes and
multimember districts tend to minimize the voting strength of minority groups by permitting
the political majority to elect all representatives of the district. A distinct minority, whether
it be a racial, ethnic, economic, or political group, may be unable to elect any representatives
in an at-large election, yet may be able to elect several representatives if the political unit is
divided into single-member districts. The minority’s voting power in a multimember district
is particularly diluted when bloc voting occurs and ballots are cast along strict majorityminority lines. While multimember districts have been challenged for ‘their winner-take-all
aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities and to overrepresent the winning party,’ this
Court has repeatedly held that they are not unconstitutional per se.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 158–59)); id. at 650–51 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Persons
of different races, like persons of different religious faiths and different political beliefs, are
equal in the eyes of the law. . . . A constitutional standard that gave special protection to
political groups identified by racial characteristics would be inconsistent with the basic tenet
of the Equal Protection Clause. Those groups are no more or no less able to pursue their
interests in the political arena than are groups defined by other characteristics. Nor can it be
said that racial alliances are so unrelated to political action that any electoral decision that
is influenced by racial consciousness—as opposed to other forms of political consciousness—is
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In Davis v. Bandemer,125 however, this historically and analytically consistent
approach appeared to collapse, and the Supreme Court’s treatment of political gerrymandering claims began to diverge from its treatment of racial gerrymandering
claims.126 This chasm would widen over the next thirty years as the Supreme Court
wandered further from the claim’s original basis and attempted—unsuccessfully—to
craft new and novel tests for political gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer127 and
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC).128
In Bandemer, the plaintiffs raised a political—rather than racial—gerrymandering
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that the State’s “reapportionment
plans constituted a political gerrymander intended to disadvantage Democrats.”129 In
evaluating the justiciability of that claim, the Court invoked the language from Baker
v. Carr that “[u]nless one of [the specific ‘political question’] formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, . . . [t]he courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide
controversy as to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional
authority.”130 Therefore, a majority of the Justices found political gerrymandering
claims to be justiciable.131
When the time came to evaluate the merits of the claim, however, the Court fractured. The plurality—led by Justice White and joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
and Marshall—held that the intent-plus-effect test used in racial vote dilution cases
should govern.132 In fact, the plurality expressly stated that “the principles developed
in [racial vote dilution] cases would apply equally to claims by political groups in
individual districts,” but noted that “the elements necessary to a successful vote dilution
inherently irrational. For it is the very political power of a racial or ethnic group that creates a
danger that an entrenched majority will take action contrary to the group’s political interests.
‘The mere fact that a number of citizens share a common ethnic, racial, or religious background does not create the need for protection against gerrymandering. It is only when their
common interests are strong enough to be manifested in political action that the need arises.
Thus the characteristic of the group which creates the need for protection is its political
character.’ It would be unrealistic to distinguish racial groups from other political groups on
the ground that race is an irrelevant factor in the political process.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Cousins v. City Council of Chi., 466 F.2d 830, 852 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893)).
125
478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion)
126
Id.
127
541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
128
548 U.S. 399 (2006) [hereinafter LULAC].
129
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115 (plurality opinion).
130
Id. at 122 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
131
See generally id.
132
See id. at 127 (holding that “in order to succeed the Bandemer plaintiffs were required
to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group,” and citing the constitutional test for racial vote dilution
established in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1980)).
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claim”—such as “historical patterns of exclusion from the political processes”—
“may be more difficult to prove in relation to a claim by a political group.” 133
Despite this explicit parallel, the plurality opinion raised a number of concerns
about political gerrymandering claims. The plurality observed:
[W]henever a legislature redistricts, those responsible for the
legislation will know the likely political composition of the new
districts and will have a prediction as to whether a particular
district is a safe one for a Democratic or Republican candidate
or is a competitive district that either candidate might win.134
The plurality then quoted Gaffney v. Cummings at length, including the observation
that “[i]t would be idle, we think, to contend that any political consideration taken
into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it. . . .
The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.”135
The plurality raised other concerns. For example, just because a disproportionate
number of representatives from one party are elected in a given election does not
mean that the election was unfair or that the districts had any kind of discriminatory
effect.136 This is simply a common consequence “inherent in winner-take-all, districtbased elections” and is “true of a racial as well as a political group.”137
The plurality also observed that any district lines drawn “to maximize the representation of each major party would require creating as many safe seats for each
party as the demographic and predicted political characteristics of the State would
permit.”138 This, the plurality observed, was precisely the approach endorsed by the
Court in Gaffney, “despite its tendency to deny safe district minorities any realistic
chance to elect their own representatives.”139 Thus, the Court noted:
[W]e have required a substantially greater showing of adverse
effects than a mere lack of proportional representation to support
a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution. Only where there is
133

Id. at 131 n.12.
Id. at 128.
135
Id. at 128–29 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752–53 (1973)).
136
See id. at 132 (noting that “the mere lack of proportional representation will not be
sufficient to prove unconstitutional discrimination”).
137
Id. at 130 (“[W]e are unprepared to hold that district-based elections decided by plurality
vote are unconstitutional in either single- or multi-member districts simply because the supporters of losing candidates have no legislative seats assigned to them.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1971))).
138
Id. at 130–31.
139
Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
134
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evidence that excluded groups have “less opportunity to participate
in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice”
have we refused to approve the use of multimember districts.140
This approach “rest[s] on a conviction that the mere fact that a particular apportionment
scheme makes it more difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect the
representatives of its choice does not render that scheme constitutionally infirm.”141
The plurality further indicated that its racial vote dilution cases had relied upon
evidence of a “lack of responsiveness by those elected to the concerns of the
relevant groups.”142 Because even someone who votes for a losing candidate “is
usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have
as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district,” the
plurality said it could not presume in a political vote dilution case, “without actual
proof to the contrary, that the candidate elected will entirely ignore the interests of
[the political minority].”143
Because the losing voters in a district would still have some access to the political process through the elected candidate, the Court held that “unconstitutional
discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that
will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political
process as a whole.”144 Despite the plurality’s indication that “[i]n both [racial and
political] contexts, the question is whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process,”145 Justice
O’Connor observed in her concurring opinion that this seemed to spell out a higher
threshold for success in political gerrymandering cases.146 Lower courts interpreting the
impact of Bandemer agreed with Justice O’Connor, and, for the next eighteen years, not
a single political gerrymandering case involving redistricting lines would succeed.147
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote a separate opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part.148 Hewing to the principles announced in Reynolds,
Justice Powell argued that a different approach should prevail:
140

Id. (quoting Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 624 (1982)) (citing White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755, 765–66 (1973); Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 150) (citing the Court’s racial vote
dilution cases).
141
Id.
142
Id. (citing Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625–27; White, 412 U.S. at 766–67).
143
Id. at 132.
144
Id. (emphasis added).
145
Id. at 132–33 (emphasis added).
146
See id. at 146–47 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the lower threshold adopted
by the plurality “can only lead to political instability and judicial malaise”).
147
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (2004) (plurality opinion) (listing cases
“in which courts rejected prayers for relief under [Bandemer]”).
148
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 161–85 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2016]

CLEARING THE POLITICAL THICKET

1127

The Equal Protection Clause guarantees citizens that their State
will govern them impartially. . . . Since the contours of a voting
district powerfully may affect citizens’ ability to exercise influence through their vote, district lines should be determined in
accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria. When deciding
where those lines will fall, the State should treat its voters as
standing in the same position, regardless of their political beliefs
or party affiliation.149
Justice Powell said the plurality’s “most basic flaw . . . is its failure to enunciate any
standard that affords guidance to legislatures and courts.”150 To help guide the
inquiry, he suggested a multifactor test examining, inter alia, the shape of the districts, adherence to the boundaries of political subdivisions, the procedures used to
adopt the plan and whether they were designed to exclude the minority party from
participating in the legislative process, and the legislative history and statements
reflecting the legislature’s goals.151
Finally, Justice O’Connor—joined by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Burger—concurred in the judgment, but argued that the claim should be dismissed for
lack of justiciability.152 Justice O’Connor contended that recognition of a political
gerrymandering claim would lead to a “proportional representation” requirement at
odds with U.S. history, traditions, and political institutions, and that the claim
brought by the plaintiffs that their power “as a group” was diluted failed to recognize that the Equal Protection Clause protects individual rights, not “group rights.”153
Over the next eighteen years, lower courts grappled with the Supreme Court’s
mixed guidance.154 The Court then entered the fray again, this time splintering even
further. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the legislature was pressured by the Republican Party
to adopt a partisan redistricting plan “as a punitive measure against Democrats for
having enacted pro-Democrat redistricting plans elsewhere.”155 Democrats filed suit,
alleging that the plan was a political gerrymander in violation of Article I and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.156
Justice Scalia led a plurality attempting to overrule Bandemer and render
political gerrymandering a nonjusticiable question. Reciting the historical roots of
149

Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
Id. at 171.
151
See id. at 173 (citing factors from Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 753–61 (1983)).
152
Id. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the “partisan gerrymandering claims
of major political parties raise a nonjusticiable political question that the judiciary should
leave to the legislative branch”).
153
Id. at 144–61.
154
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (2004) (plurality opinion) (listing cases involving political gerrymandering that were unsuccessful).
155
Id. at 272.
156
Id.
150
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gerrymandering, Justice Scalia observed that gerrymandering has long existed in
American politics,157 and that Congress has the power to intervene in the regulation
of elections if it deems it necessary.158 He also noted that all of the cases that involved
districting lines over the eighteen years after Bandemer had failed,159 and that the
Justices themselves were still unable to agree on any coherent approach to adjudicating such claims.160 Justice Scalia also raised a number of concerns and objections to
judicial involvement in political gerrymandering cases, which will be discussed at
greater length below.161
Justice Kennedy, in an unusual disposition, agreed with the plurality that the claim
should be dismissed in the case at hand, but did not foreclose the possibility of relief in
a future case.162 Justice Kennedy also floated a theory that future litigants might try to
proceed under a First Amendment theory, reasoning that partisan gerrymanders might
have “the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters’ representational rights.”163
Among the remaining four Justices—Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer—three separate dissenting opinions issued, all offering different visions of how
a partisan gerrymandering claim should proceed. First, Justice Stevens suggested
that political gerrymandering claims should be governed by the Shaw line of racial
sorting cases164 because “political affiliation is not an appropriate standard” for
districting165 and the Court has protected political belief and association vigorously
under the First Amendment.166 In reiterating that “the concept of equal justice under
law requires the State to govern impartially,” Justice Stevens stated:
Today’s plurality opinion would exempt governing officials from
that duty in the context of legislative redistricting and would
give license, for the first time, to partisan gerrymanders that are
devoid of any rational justification. In my view, when partisanship is the legislature’s sole motivation—when any pretense of
neutrality is forsaken unabashedly and all traditional districting
criteria are subverted for partisan advantage—the governing
body cannot be said to have acted impartially.167
157

See id. at 274–77 (noting “[p]olitical gerrymanders are not new to the American scene”).
See id. at 276–77 (reciting instances of congressional intervention).
159
See id. at 280 n.6.
160
See id. at 292 (noting that “four dissenters [had] come up with three different standards”).
161
See infra notes 182–87 and accompanying text.
162
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting a possibility of relief “if some
limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution”).
163
Id. at 314.
164
See id. at 322–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the Shaw line of cases in which
racial gerrymandering can lead to equal protection concerns).
165
Id. at 325.
166
See id. at 324 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976)).
167
Id. at 317–18 (emphasis added).
158
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Thus, according to that view, “the critical issue in both racial and political gerrymandering cases is the same: whether a single nonneutral [sic] criterion controlled
the districting process to such an extent that the Constitution was offended.”168 Whenever this occurs, it “imposes a cognizable ‘representational har[m].’”169
Next, Justice Souter—joined by Justice Ginsburg—argued for a multifactor test,
requiring plaintiffs to show (1) membership in a cohesive political group, (2) the
legislature’s disregard for traditional districting criteria, (3) correlations between
these deviations and the distribution of plaintiff’s political group, (4) the existence
of a hypothetical district with less deviation from traditional criteria, and (5) defendants’ intentional manipulation of districts to pack or crack plaintiff’s political
group.170 In articulating the theory of harm, Justice Souter called it “a species of vote
dilution: the point of the gerrymander is to capture seats by manipulating district
lines to diminish the weight of the other party’s votes in elections.” 171
Lastly, Justice Breyer would have looked at the plan as a whole—rather than
individual districts—and inquired into whether it reflected the “unjustified use of
political factors to entrench a minority in power.”172 This approach would look for
“strong indicia of abuse.”173
The final major chapter in the Supreme Court’s political gerrymandering saga
is League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC).174 Although continuing to express disagreement, the majority reaffirmed that such claims are justiciable, even if clear standards have not yet evolved.175 In the majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy entertained the appellants’ proposed “sole-intent” test, but ultimately found
it “not convincing”:
To begin with, the state appellees dispute the assertion that partisan gain was the “sole” motivation for the decision to replace
Plan 1151C. . . . The legislature does seem to have decided to
redistrict with the sole purpose of achieving a Republican congressional majority, but partisan aims did not guide every line it
drew. . . . [T]he contours of some contested district lines were
drawn based on more mundane and local interests. . . . [And] a
number of line-drawing requests by Democratic state legislators
were honored.176
168

Id. at 326.
Id. at 330 (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (2002)).
170
See id. at 347–50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
171
Id. at 354.
172
Id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173
Id. at 365.
174
548 U.S. 399 (2006).
175
See id. at 414 (noting the historical split as to whether such claims were justiciable but
that the Court would “not revisit [its] justiciability holding”).
176
Id. at 417–18 (citation omitted).
169
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In addition, Justice Kennedy postulated that “a successful claim attempting to identify unconstitutional acts of partisan gerrymandering must do what appellants’ solemotivation theory explicitly disavows: show a burden, as measured by a reliable
standard, on the complainants’ representational rights.”177
Justice Stevens—joined by Justice Breyer—then proposed a test wherein a
plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent by showing that: (1) “redistricters subordinated neutral districting principles to political considerations”; and (2) “their predominant motive was to maximize one party’s power,” along with discriminatory
effect by showing that: “(1) her candidate of choice won election under the old plan;
(2) her residence is now in a district that is a safe seat for the opposite party; and (3) her
new district is less compact than the old district.”178 Justices Scalia and Thomas adhered to their prior position in Vieth, arguing that the question should be nonjusticiable.179 Finally, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito—both of whom had
yet to express an opinion on the matter since joining the Court—declined to weigh
in, stating that the plaintiffs had not provided an adequate standard but that the question of justiciability had not been argued.180
Following these fractured decisions, only two things seem clear. First, political
gerrymandering claims remain justiciable. Indeed, the Supreme Court reiterated the
justiciability of political gerrymandering claims just this past term.181 Second, any
viable political gerrymandering claim must be able to successfully respond to the
arguments raised by the plurality in Vieth. These include the following:
1. Race is an impermissible factor to consider in drawing legislative districts, whereas political affiliation is a permissible factor to consider.182
2. Race is an immutable characteristic, whereas political affiliation is not.183
3. Political gerrymandering claims do not provide manageable and administrable standards.184
177

Id. at 418.
Id. at 475–76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179
See id. at 511 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271–306 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
180
See id. at 492 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The question
whether any such standard exists—that is, whether a challenge to a political gerrymander
presents a justiciable case or controversy—has not been argued in these cases.”).
181
See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2658 (2015).
182
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285–86 (plurality opinion) (noting that the Constitution “contemplates
districting by political entities,” but “segregating voters on the basis of race is not . . . lawful”).
183
Id. at 287 (“[A] person’s politics is rarely as readily discernable—and never as permanently discernible—as a person’s race.”).
184
Id. at 286 (noting that a court is “justified in accepting a modest degree of unmanageability to enforce a constitutional command” such as policing race discrimination, but is “not
justified in inferring a judicially enforceable constitutional obligation . . . not to apply too
178
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4. Political gerrymandering claims require courts to determine what political systems and theories are “fair.”185
5. Consideration of political factors is “inevitable” in the legislative districting process.186
6. Political gerrymandering claims are grounded in a presumed right to
proportional representation, which the Constitution does not provide.187
Although these arguments may appear difficult to overcome at first glance, the
inevitable intersection of OPOV, racial gerrymandering, and political gerrymandering claims has provided a useful framework for analyzing the similarities and distinctions between each. We now turn to these cases.
D. Cromartie: The Intersection of Racial and Political Gerrymandering
As racial sorting claims became more common, a question arose about the role of
“political considerations” in crafting districts. If voters were sorted between districts
on the basis of their political affiliations, and there was a strong correlation between political affiliation and race, would politics or race be considered to have predominated?
In Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I),188 the district court had granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on a racial sorting claim.189 The Supreme Court
found a material dispute of fact and reversed.190 Although the evidence presented
“tend[ed] to support an inference that the State drew its district lines with an impermissible racial motive,”191 state officials offered testimony from legislators stating that
“in crafting their districting law, they attempted to protect incumbents, to adhere to
traditional districting criteria, and to preserve the existing partisan balance in the
State’s congressional delegation, which in 1997 was composed of six Republicans
and six Democrats.”192
In reversing and sending the case back to the district court for further examination, the Court stated that their “prior decisions ha[d] made clear that a jurisdiction
may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the
most loyal Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were
much partisanship in districting,” which is an obligation that is “both dubious and severely
unmanageable”).
185
Id. at 291 (“‘Fairness’ does not seem to us a judicially manageable standard.”).
186
Id. at 285 (arguing that districting by political entities is “root-and-branch a matter
of politics”).
187
Id. at 287–88 (“[T]his standard rests upon the principle that groups . . . have a right to
proportional representation. But the Constitution contains no such principle.”).
188
526 U.S. 541 (1999).
189
Id. at 543.
190
Id. at 553–54.
191
Id. at 548–49.
192
Id. at 549.

1132

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:1107

conscious of that fact.”193 The Court included a string citation to the full line of
Shaw doctrine cases,194 including Bush v. Vera,195 Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II),196 Miller
v. Johnson,197 and Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I).198 This seemingly straightforward statement and list of citations was followed by an unassuming footnote. The footnote
states: “This Court has recognized, however, that political gerrymandering claims
are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause although we [are] not in agreement
as to the standards that would govern such a claim.”199
In other words, political considerations may predominate so long as the jurisdiction engages in “constitutional political gerrymandering.”200 Just as a state may
engage in some degree of racial gerrymandering in order to fulfill a compelling state
objective, so too may a state engage in political gerrymandering, assuming it complies
with the requirements of some as-of-yet-undefined constitutional rule.
This raises a question of confounding variables. If a district appears to be
gerrymandered, did racial or political considerations predominate in the districting
calculus? If there is a tight correlation between race and political preference, then
the court must look carefully to determine if racial considerations predominated or
if political considerations predominated.
The Cromartie case would eventually return to the Supreme Court.201 On remand,
the district court found that the State had sought to “maintain the existing partisan
balance in the State’s congressional delegation . . . [by] avoid[ing] placing two incumbents in the same district and . . . preserv[ing] the partisan core of the existing
districts.”202 In addition, the lower court found that the legislature used “facially race
driven” criteria in the districting process.203 Ultimately, the lower court held that racial
considerations predominated.204
In Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the lower court’s finding was clearly erroneous.205 This was because the burden on
plaintiffs alleging racial sorting was a “demanding one.”206 The Court observed that
193

Id. at 551.
Id.
195
517 U.S. 952 (1996).
196
517 U.S. 899 (1996).
197
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
198
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
199
Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 551 n.7 (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986)
(plurality opinion)).
200
Id. at 551 (emphasis added).
201
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) [hereinafter Cromartie II].
202
Id. at 239–40 (quoting Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407, 413 (E.D.N.C. 2000)).
203
See id. at 240 (citing Cromartie, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 420).
204
See id. at 237.
205
Id. at 258.
206
See id. at 241, 257 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995) (O’Connor,
J., concurring)).
194
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“the underlying districting decision is one that ordinarily falls within a legislature’s
sphere of competence,”207 and “the legislature ‘must have discretion to exercise the
political judgment necessary to balance competing interests.’”208 This is especially
the case “where the State has articulated a legitimate political explanation for its
districting decision, and the voting population is one in which race and political affiliation are highly correlated.”209 Here, where the State sought “to maintain a six/six
Democrat/Republican delegation split,”210 “the party attacking the legislatively drawn
boundaries must show at the least that the legislature could have achieved its legitimate
political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional districting principles.”211
Following Cromartie II, states have tended to rely upon “political predominance”
arguments to defeat allegations of “racial predominance” in districting decisions.212
In attempting to show political predominance, states frequently contend that they
sought to advance partisan goals or insulate incumbents. But Cromartie II did not
completely answer the question left open in Cromartie I: Can political or incumbency considerations constitutionally predominate for these purposes?
E. Larios: The Intersection of OPOV and Gerrymandering
The Supreme Court has also been faced with cases treading the boundary between
its OPOV precedents and its gerrymandering precedents. The most well-known case
in this line is Larios v. Cox.213
In Larios, the Northern District of Georgia struck down a plan with a total population deviation of 9.98%.214 Although Georgia’s plan was entitled to a presumption
of good faith because the total population deviation was below 10%, the lower court
noted that the 10% marker “does not completely insulate a state’s districting plan
from attack of any type” but only determines how to allocate the burden for proving
the OPOV violation.215 Although the State attempted to justify its deviations on the
basis of “incumbency protection,” the court held that “the protection of incumbents
is a permissible cause of population deviations only when it is limited to the avoidance
of contests between incumbents and is applied in a consistent and nondiscriminatory
manner.”216 In the plan at issue in Larios, “the deviations were created to protect
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

Id. at 242 (citing Miller, 515 U.S. at 915).
Id. (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 915).
Id.
Id. at 246–47.
Id. at 258.
See, e.g., Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 947 (2004).
300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004), summ. aff’d by Cox, 542 U.S. 947.
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1340 (quoting Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1220 (4th Cir. 1996)).
Id. at 1338.
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incumbents in a wholly inconsistent and discriminatory way.”217 The court went on
to observe in dicta that “the Supreme Court has never sanctioned partisan advantage
as a legitimate justification for population deviations.”218
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the lower court’s decision.219 Writing
in concurrence, Justice Stevens—joined by Justice Breyer—noted that “selective incumbent protection” and partisan advantage could not justify the State’s “conceded
deviations from the principle of one person, one vote.”220 In closing, Justice Stevens
argued that “in time the present ‘failure of judicial will’” to adjudicate political gerrymandering “will be replaced by stern condemnation of partisan gerrymandering that
does not even pretend to be justified by neutral principles.”221
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that “politics as usual” is a “traditional” redistricting criterion,222 and is constitutional “so long as it does not go too far.”223 As such,
Justice Scalia would have “set the case for argument” instead of affirming.224 There
was, however, no explanation of what action would “go too far.”225
In later cases, the Court has qualified its decision, noting that the district court
in Larios “‘[did] not resolve the issue of whether or when partisan advantage alone
may justify deviations in population’ because the plans were ‘plainly unlawful’ and
any partisan motivations were ‘bound up inextricably’ with other clearly rejected
objectives.”226 As such, the constitutionality of deviations from population equality
for partisan advantage remains an open question.
II. THREE CONCEPTUAL SNARES
The Supreme Court’s hesitance in this arena is perhaps well warranted. Lost in the
midst of the political thicket, the Court has had a difficult time ascertaining when, and
why, political gerrymandering offends constitutional principles. Without a clear analytical and precedential path, it makes sense to exercise restraint. Justice Scalia’s attempts
to render political gerrymandering a nonjusticiable question typified this caution.227
Yet, stronger still has been Justice Kennedy’s conviction that though “great
caution is necessary when approaching this subject,” the Court should remain prepared
to afford judicial relief if a “precise rationale [is] found to correct an established
217

Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1351.
219
Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
220
Id. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring).
221
Id. at 951 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 341 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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Id. at 952 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223
Id. (emphasis added).
224
Id.
225
See generally id. at 951–52.
226
LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 423 (2006) (quoting Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1352
(N.D. Ga. 2004)).
227
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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violation of the Constitution.”228 Below, I explore three conceptual snares that appear
to have frustrated the Court’s effort to identify constitutional violations with the necessary precision.
A. Personal Interests v. State Interests
Let us consider, for a moment, a state that enacts a strict voter identification law.
This law ostensibly is passed to prevent voter fraud and enhance the legitimacy of
the democratic process. When the law is challenged in court, the government comes
forth and proffers this interest. One might well argue that the actual purpose of the
law is to disadvantage a particular political party, but that is a proposition that requires proof. The government has defended the law on the ground of “preventing
voter fraud,” which is a legitimate, neutral state interest.
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,229 the Supreme Court upheld just
such a voter identification law because it was “a nondiscriminatory law . . . supported by valid neutral justifications.”230 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
noted that the law should be upheld because it “draws no classifications, let alone
discriminatory ones,” and the legislature’s judgment should prevail unless the law
“is intended to disadvantage a particular class.”231
But now, let us consider a slightly different hypothetical. What if the same state
passes the same voter identification law and, when called to account in court, the
government comes forth and proffers “political advantage” as its state interest? Rather
than defending the law on the basis of a neutral interest in “preventing voter fraud,” the
government—representing the entire body politic—is now arguing in open court that
the law should stand because it furthers the state’s interest in “advantaging” Republicans or Democrats. Would any court truly entertain the legitimacy of a “state interest” in “preventing” the election of Democrats or Republicans? The notion is risible.
And yet, this is precisely the issue upon which the Supreme Court has been found
waffling when the legislation in question is redistricting legislation.232 The problem
here is the Court’s failure to distinguish between the unavoidable personal considerations of individual legislators and the “state interest” proffered on behalf of the
government itself.
228

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
553 U.S. 181 (2008).
230
Id. at 204.
231
Id. at 205, 208 (Scalia, J., concurring).
232
See, e.g., Jurisdictional Statement, Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 14232, 2015 WL 2473529, at i (probable jurisdiction noted June 30, 2015) (Question Presented:
“Does the desire to gain partisan advantage for one political party justify intentionally creating
over-populated legislative districts that result in tens of thousands of individual voters being
denied Equal Protection because their individual votes are devalued, violating the one-person,
one-vote principle?”).
229
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As the Supreme Court held in Romer v. Evans,233 when legislation is “inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests.”234 In Romer, the Court was confronted with a facial classification regarding sexual orientation.235 By requiring that the facial classification
at least “bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end,
[the Court] ensure[s] that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”236 A law adopted for the bare desire to disadvantage an identifiable subset of the population is, simply put, not enacted pursuant to
a legitimate state interest.237
There is a difference between the “incidental disadvantages” that result to certain
persons due to “laws enacted for broad and ambitious purposes . . . explained by reference to legitimate public policies,” and the “bare . . . desire to harm” a group politically disfavored by a majority of legislators.238 This would be “a status-based enactment
divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake,
something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.”239 As the Romer Court
stated, “A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal
protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”240
Whether or not legislation employs a facial classification, the suggestion that
“partisan advantage” could be proffered in court as a state interest is a disturbing
one. As the Supreme Court recognized in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, “while sovereign powers
are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the
people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts.”241
Simply put, the state, qua state, has no cognizable interest in which party wins
a democratic election or which party ascends to power. That is what distinguishes
a vibrant, functioning democracy that respects the will of the voters from a corrupt
shell of a republic where partisans openly rig elections in order to retain their grip
on power with the blessing of a complicit judiciary.242 Because “the election of
233

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
235
Id. at 625.
236
Id. at 633.
237
See id.
238
Id. at 634–35 (second alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
239
Id. at 635.
240
Id. at 633.
241
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
242
“Whether spoken with concern or pride, it is unfortunate that our legislators have
reached the point of declaring that, when it comes to apportionment: ‘We are in the business
of rigging elections.’” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting J. Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, WINSTON-SALEM
234
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Democrats” or “the election of Republicans” cannot be said to advance a neutral
interest on behalf of the entire body politic, an interest in “partisan advantage” cannot
be proffered in court as a constitutional state interest. A claimed interest in “partisan
advantage” is inherently tantamount to a claimed interest in “partisan suppression.”
And, although partisans may have a personal interest in defeating their rivals at the
polls, one cannot claim that their personal interest in victory constitutes a legitimate
state interest. As the Supreme Court recently stated in Arizona State Legislature v.
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission: “‘[P]artisan gerrymanders’ . . . ‘[are
incompatible] with democratic principles.’ . . . ‘[T]he true principle of a republic is,
that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.’”243 The sad cliché
that representatives now pick the voters instead of voters picking the representatives
reflects the twisted outcome of an assumption that the State can proffer personal,
rather than public, interests in court as “legitimate state interests.”
This conflation of personal interests with state interests applies to districts defended on the basis of “incumbency advantage” as well. As explained above, the
very notion of “incumbency advantage” suggests a cognizable state interest in “challenger suppression.” But entrenching incumbents and preventing the success of new
entrants is not a state interest.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reflected upon the impropriety of laws that
shield incumbents from vigorous democratic competition. For example, in the context
of campaign finance law, the Court has not hesitated to strike down even neutral
laws advancing neutral state interests based at least in part on the risk that such laws
“can harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective
campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.”244 In a particularly trenchant passage regarding such laws, Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote:
[It is] submit[ted] that we should “accord special deference
to [Congress’] judgment on questions related to the extent and
nature of limits on campaign spending.” This position poses
great risk . . . [and] let[s] the fox stand watch over the henhouse. There is good reason to think that campaign reform is
an especially inappropriate area for judicial deference to legislative judgment. What the argument for deference fails to acknowledge is the potential for legislators to set the rules of the
electoral game so as to keep themselves in power and to keep
potential challengers out of it. (“Courts must police inhibitions
J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1); see also id. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The problem, simply put,
is that the will of the cartographers rather than the will of the people will govern.”).
243
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658, 2675 (2015) (first, third, and fifth alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
244
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 232 (2006).
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on . . . political activity because we cannot trust elected officials
to do so.”).245
The Supreme Court likely would not take the view that its bone-deep skepticism of
incumbency entrenchment in the campaign finance context is somehow unwarranted
in the redistricting context where legislators openly “declar[e] that . . . ‘[they] are
in the business of rigging elections.’”246 Such entrenchment is antithetical to democratic principles of representativeness and accountability and could potentially
contribute to degradation in functional governance by reducing the electoral consequences of gridlock and mismanagement.
In short, “electoral advantage”—whether in the form of “partisan advantage” or
“incumbency advantage”—is not a legitimate state interest that can be proffered in
court as a justification for redistricting legislation. To allow such an interest to be
claimed is contrary to the very notion that “sovereignty itself remains with the people,
by whom and for whom all government exists and acts.”247 If the government may
openly place its thumb upon the scales in determining who wins and loses its elections, and receives judicial cover in doing so, then our constitution protects little more
than the illusion of democracy.
Therefore, the Court should recognize the difference between legislators’ personal
considerations—which will unavoidably motivate the enactment of neutral laws with
incidental partisan effects—and the legislature’s proffered state interests—which
must provide neutral justifications for challenged state action.
B. How Much “Political Interest” v. What Type of “Political Interest”
Once we have dispelled the notion that the state can claim a constitutional interest
in electing particular parties or individuals, we can view Supreme Court precedent
with a more discerning eye. As recently as this last term, for example, the Court reiterated that “incumbency protection” and “political affiliation” are legitimate criteria
that legislatures may consider in drawing legislative districts.248 This much is well
established. But a closer look at these precedents unearths the second snare: the assumption that the constitutionality of political districting turns on whether legislators
have “go[ne] too far.”249
245

Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 644 n.9 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (third and eighth alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
246
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Hoeffel, supra note 242, at
B1).
247
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1986).
248
Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1270 (2015) (citing Bush
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964, 968 (1996)).
249
See, e.g., Cox v. Lairos, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The question is not “how much” a state can use incumbency considerations and
political affiliation before offending the Constitution; rather, the principal question
is “what type” of “political interest” or “incumbency protection” is constitutionally
permissible. In other words, the constitutionality of political districting primarily turns
on the purpose, not the degree, of the gerrymander.
In Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, the Supreme Court listed “incumbency protection” and “political affiliation” among the race-neutral districting
principles that may “offset” racial considerations when determining whether a district has been drawn predominantly on the basis of race or other criteria.250 For
support, the Court cited to the principal opinion in Bush v. Vera.251 It is here that we
find the precedential lineage of these criteria and the contours of their constitutional—and unconstitutional—use.
With respect to the proper use of “political affiliation” in districting, the principal opinion in Bush cites to Davis v. Bandemer and Gaffney v. Cummings.252 A clear
majority of the Bandemer Court held that districting for political purposes could
violate the Equal Protection Clause but split on the applicable test.253 We will return
to Bandemer when we evaluate the third analytical oversight plaguing political
gerrymandering case law below. The principal Bush opinion’s citation to Gaffney,
however, is revealing. The opinion properly cites Gaffney for the proposition that
states “may draw irregular district lines in order to allocate seats proportionately
to major political parties.”254 Unlike an interest in “political advantage,” the state
can claim an interest in “political fairness.”255
In Gaffney, repeated legislative attempts at districting had failed, and the final
step under the State’s constitution was to convene a three-person bipartisan board.256
In crafting its plan, the Board attempted to achieve “substantial population equality”
under the OPOV principle and also “consciously and overtly adopted and followed
a policy of ‘political fairness,’ which aimed at a rough scheme of proportional representation of the two major political parties.”257
Senate and House districts were structured so that the composition of both Houses would reflect “as closely as possible . . . the
actual [statewide] plurality of vote on the House or Senate lines
250

Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1270 (citing Bush, 517 U.S. at 964, 968).
Id. (citing Bush, 517 U.S. at 964, 968).
252
Bush, 517 U.S. at 964–65.
253
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (plurality opinion); id. at 161 (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
254
Bush, 517 U.S. at 964–65 (emphasis added) (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735, 757–59 (1973)).
255
See generally Gaffney, 412 U.S. 735.
256
Id. at 736.
257
Id. at 738.
251
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in a given election.” Rather than focusing on party membership
in the respective districts, the Board took into account the party
voting results in the preceding three statewide elections, and, on
that basis, created what was thought to be a proportionate number of Republican and Democratic legislative seats.258
In challenging the plan, “[c]onsiderable evidence was introduced demonstrating the
obvious political considerations in the Board’s district making.”259
In upholding the plan, the Court cited Reynolds and began with the observation
that “the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is . . . the basic
aim of legislative apportionment.”260 The Court stated:
We are quite unconvinced that the reapportionment plan
offered by the three-member Board violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because it attempted to reflect the relative strength
of the parties in locating and defining election districts. It would
be idle, we think, to contend that any political consideration taken
into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient to
invalidate it. . . . The very essence of districting is to produce a
different—a more “politically fair”—result than would be reached
with elections at large, in which the winning party would take
100% of the legislative seats. Politics and political considerations
are inseparable from districting and apportionment. The political
profile of a State, its party registration, and voting records are available precinct by precinct, ward by ward. These subdivisions may
not be identical with census tracts, but, when overlaid on a census map, it requires no special genius to recognize the political
consequences of drawing a district line along one street rather
than another. It is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable,
that the location and shape of districts may well determine the
political complexion of the area. District lines are rarely neutral
phenomena. They can well determine what district will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make
a close race likely. Redistricting may pit incumbents against one
another or make very difficult the election of the most experienced legislator. The reality is that districting inevitably has and
is intended to have substantial political consequences.261
258

Id. (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 739.
260
Id. at 748. (alteration in original) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–66
(1964)).
261
Id. at 752–53 (emphasis added).
259
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The Court further noted that a “politically mindless approach may produce, whether
intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered results.”262
In closing, the Court reiterated that “[w]hat is done in so arranging for elections,
or to achieve political ends or allocate political power, is not wholly exempt from
judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment,” and that a districting scheme
“may be vulnerable, if racial or political groups have [had] . . . their voting strength
invidiously minimized. Beyond this, we have not ventured far or attempted the impossible task of extirpating politics from what are the essentially political processes
of the sovereign States.”263 Because the State had “purport[ed] fairly to allocate
political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within
quite tolerable limits, succeed[ed] in doing so,” the judicial interest in intervention
was “at its lowest ebb.”264 Rather than attempting “to minimize or eliminate the
political strength of any group or party,” the State had instead attempted “to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation
in the legislative halls of the State.”265 Thus, the plan was upheld.266
Astonishingly, Gaffney is frequently ripped from this unique context and cited for
the wider proposition that political considerations are “inevitable”—and, therefore,
“permissible”—in the districting process, regardless of the interest advanced.267 To
the contrary, Gaffney recognized that the State was not attempting to “minimize or
eliminate the political strength of any group or party,” but rather was attempting “to
recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation.”268 The Court accepted this use of “political affiliation” criteria, but explicitly
recognized that the allocation of political power through redistricting was not exempt
from judicial scrutiny.269
Gaffney, then, provides our guiding light to understanding the difference between
the constitutional and unconstitutional uses of “political affiliation” districting criteria.270 As we recognized above, legislators will undoubtedly be aware of the political consequences of their districting decisions, and it would be an “impossible task”
to “extirpat[e] politics” from the redistricting process.271 That does not, however,

262

Id. at 753.
Id. at 754 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
264
Id. (emphasis added).
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285–86 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting Gaffney,
412 U.S. at 753, for its phrase: “The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to
have substantial political consequences”).
268
Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 754.
269
Id.
270
See id.
271
Id.
263
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grant legislators carte blanche to leverage redistricting legislation to advance an interest in “political advantage” as opposed to “political fairness.”272
Similarly, in Cromartie II, the Supreme Court was faced with competing racial and
political explanations for the challenged districts.273 The Court found that political considerations predominated and upheld the district boundaries.274 There, the State’s
purported interest was in “partisan balance” and the map was drawn to reflect a “six/six
Democrat/Republican delegation split.”275 Based on the State’s then-recent statewide
elections, this six/six split appears to have reflected a fairly even split in statewide
voter political preferences.276 In other words, the political districting in Cromartie
II advanced a state interest in “political fairness.”277
272

See id.
See generally Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
274
Id. at 258 (reversing district court determination that race, rather than politics, predominated in the North Carolina legislature’s drawing of district boundaries).
275
Id. at 246–47, 253.
276
In North Carolina’s 1996 elections, three statewide races reflected a fairly even split
in voter political preference. The race for Governor yielded 55.98% Democratic and 42.75%
Republican voting inputs. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Abstract of Votes Cast in the General
Election Held on November 5, 1996: Governor, NCSBE.GOV (Dec. 6, 2011), ftp://alt.ncsbe
.gov/ENRS/ElectResults_Pre_2007/1996_11_05/19961105_results_Governor.pdf. The race
for U.S. Senator yielded 45.92% Democratic and 52.64% Republican voting inputs. N.C.
State Bd. of Elections, Abstract of Votes Cast in the General Election Held on November 5,
1996: United States Senate, NCSBE.GOV (Dec. 6, 2011), ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov/ENRS/Elect
Results_Pre_2007/1996_11_05/19961105_results_US_Senate.pdf. The race for U.S. President
yielded 44.04% Democratic and 48.73% Republican voting inputs. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Abstract of Votes Cast in the General Election Held on November 5, 1996: United States
President, NCSBE.GOV (Dec. 6, 2011), ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov/ENRS/ElectResults_Pre_2007
/1996_11_05/19961105_results_President.pdf.
Admittedly, the Cromartie Court appears to have examined a plan based off of prior
congressional delegate numbers. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999) (“[I]n crafting
their districting law, they attempted to . . . preserve the existing partisan balance in the
State’s congressional delegation . . . .”). But to the extent this interest in retaining the same
partisan delegation numbers still reasonably reflected the underlying political strength of
parties in the state, the difference between a state interest in reflecting the “outputs” (i.e.,
how many representatives were elected for party X in the preceding elections) as opposed
to a state interest in reflecting the “inputs” (i.e., how many voters cast a ballot for party X
in the preceding elections) was never explored by the Court in that case. See id. An attempt
to conflate these outputs and inputs may be a clever way to couch raw political gain in the
language of electoral fairness, but the interest proposed would be an irrational one. The
representatives elected are a byproduct of the very lines in question, so looking to prior
legislative delegations does not gauge the political preferences of the voters without the
interfering variable of the lines themselves. The purpose of redistricting is to redraw the lines
in light of underlying changes in the State’s population densities and demographics. Resort to the
outputs of the prior lines (i.e., “preserving the status quo”) undermines the meaning of the
redistricting exercise by attributing unwarranted weight to the very lines being replaced.
277
See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 738.
273
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Admittedly, districting for predominantly political reasons to achieve a rough
approximation of statewide proportional representation may require intentional political vote dilution within each of the state’s districts. As Justice O’Connor remarked in her concurring Bandemer opinion, “[a] bipartisan gerrymander employs
the same technique, and has the same effect on individual voters, as does a partisan
gerrymander.”278 Similarly, advancing an interest in “competitive” elections could
require states to draw lines that disregard neutral districting conventions as well. As
Justice Scalia observed in Vieth, the Equal Protection Clause does not “take sides”
in a dispute over “whether it is better for Democratic voters to have their [representatives] include 10 wishy-washy Democrats (because Democratic voters are ‘effectively’ distributed so as to constitute bare majorities in many districts), or 5 hardcore
Democrats (because Democratic voters are tightly packed in a few districts).”279
There is a danger in mindless obedience to “neutral shapes,” which may themselves
result in “self-gerrymandering.”280 “[B]ecause, in recent political memory, Democrats have often been concentrated in cities while Republicans have often been
concentrated in suburbs and sometimes rural areas, geographically drawn boundaries
have tended to ‘pac[k]’ the former.”281
The legislature need not bend the knee to neutral districting conventions. Political classifications may be employed to reflect differing views about what constitutes
the “fairest” political system, whether it be one that encourages strong partisan
identities and more stable representation or one that encourages moderation, competition, and the possibility of more frequent “turfing.” This is a judgment that the
people and their representatives—not the courts—are equipped to make. And, a state
interest in adopting a “fair” system of democratic representation is undoubtedly a
compelling interest.
However, when the state enters a federal court and explicitly confesses to intentional political vote dilution based on a proffered interest in “partisan advantage”
rather than “partisan balance,” “competitive districts,” or any other state justification
278

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 154 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 n.9 (2004) (plurality opinion).
280
Id. at 290.
281
Id. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original). The Court has upheld
the states’ power to employ offsetting instances of political vote dilution within individual
districts in order to achieve statewide proportional representation. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at
738. The Court has not, however, permitted the same in the racial vote dilution context. See
LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 429 (2006). The simplest answer to this apparent conflict is that such
districting does not actually remedy VRA violations. The constitutional answer, however,
is that a state cannot seek to cure racial dilution in one part of the state with countervailing
opportunities in another part of the state because doing so entails “offensive and demeaning
assumption[s] that voters of a particular race, because of their race, ‘think alike, share the
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.’” Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995) (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)). Voters of the same
party, on the other hand, will tend to “share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidates at the polls” almost by definition. Id.
279
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reasonably reflecting an interest in “political fairness,” the opposing party can challenge the legitimacy of that argument as offensive to the Equal Protection Clause.
In such a scenario, Justice Scalia’s hypothetical choice between two arguably fair
alternatives (10 wishy-washy Democrats or 5 hardcore Democrats) breaks down
because the state is no longer “purport[ing] fairly to allocate political power to the
parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within quite tolerable limits,
succeed[ing] in doing so.”282 Instead, the state is requesting judicial sanction to intentionally suppress the vote of those who do not favor its preordained candidates.
As with race, the mere awareness or consideration of voters’ political affiliation
by legislators is both unavoidable and constitutionally acceptable. As the Gaffney
Court observed:
It would be idle, we think, to contend that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is
sufficient to invalidate it. . . . The very essence of districting is
to produce a different—a more “politically fair”—result . . . .
Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.283
Accordingly, districting on the basis of political affiliation may be a legitimate
criterion for the legislature to consider. But, as with racial demographic information,
there are “permissible” and “impermissible” uses of political affiliation information.284 Just because a legislator may be aware of racial demographics and may use
that information to advance an interest in compliance with federal antidiscrimination
law, does not mean a legislator could use the same information to advance an “interest”
in “black voter suppression” or “white voter suppression.” The same divide between
permissible and impermissible uses arises when a legislator consciously employs
political affiliation information.
A similar dichotomy can be found with respect to “incumbency considerations.”
As the Court noted in LULAC, “incumbency protection can be a legitimate factor in
districting, but experience teaches that incumbency protection can take various forms,
not all of them in the interests of the constituents.”285
282

Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 754.
Id. at 752–53 (emphasis added).
284
See id. at 754 (“What is done in so arranging for elections, or to achieve political ends
or allocate political power, is not wholly exempt from judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2658 (2015) (reaffirming that “partisan gerrymanders . . . are incompatible with democratic
principles” and that partisan gerrymanders present justiciable claims) (brackets omitted)
(quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292 (plurality opinion); id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring));
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 413–14 (holding that political gerrymandering is unconstitutional).
285
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 440–41 (citation omitted) (citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725, 740 (1983)).
283
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The principal opinion in Bush—again, carefully adhering to the precise contours
of prior precedent—discerned that the Supreme Court had “recognized incumbency
protection, at least in the limited form of ‘avoiding contests between incumbents,’
as a legitimate state goal.”286 Just like racial and political considerations, incumbency considerations may be permissible depending upon the interest sought. Reviewing Court precedent on this question makes clear that, although the state may
have a legitimate interest in “incumbency pairing prevention,”287 it does not have a
legitimate interest in “incumbency advantage.”288 To the extent prior precedent endorses an interest in “incumbency protection,” that interest is in protection from each
other and not protection from all others.289
286

Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964–65 (1996) (alterations omitted) (emphasis added).
See Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 3, 8 (2012) (“[O]ur cases leave little
doubt that avoiding contests between incumbents . . . [is a] valid, neutral state districting
polic[y].”). Admittedly, this statement might be a bit oversold. The seminal cases frequently
cited by the Supreme Court for this proposition do not so clearly hold.
In Burns v. Richardson, the State proffered a number of justifications for its selection
of multimember districts, none of which included “incumbent contest prevention.” 384 U.S.
73, 89 n.15 (1966). Rather, the district court found that the choice “was the conscious or
unconscious—though not unnatural—reluctance of the affected senators to carve out singlemember districts which thereafter would in all probability result in a political duel-to-thedeath with a fellow and neighbor senator.” Id. at 87. The Supreme Court held that “[t]he fact
that district boundaries may have been drawn in a way that minimizes the number of contests
between present incumbents does not in and of itself establish invidiousness.” Id. at 89 n.16
(emphasis added). In other words, the fact that the lines were drawn in a way that happened
to prevent incumbents from being forced into competition with each other was relevant to,
but not dispositive of, whether the lines were intentionally designed or operated to dilute the
vote of “political elements” in the population. Id. Far from endorsing “incumbency protection”
as a legitimate government interest, Burns implies that “incumbency protection” is an illegitimate government interest and that lines drawn on this basis constitute circumstantial evidence of unconstitutional vote dilution. See generally id.
In Gaffney v. Cummings, the Court observed in passing that incumbents would naturally be
well aware of the consequences of their decisions, and that “[r]edistricting may pit incumbents
against one another.” 412 U.S. at 753. As this Article discusses, however, a mere consideration
or awareness of districting consequences by individual legislators—whether with respect to race,
party, or incumbency—is different than a proffered state interest in these districting criteria.
Finally, in White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973), the Court acknowledged the State’s
proffered interest in retaining incumbents and “d[id] not disparage this interest,” but also did
not pass judgment on it: “[W]e need not decide whether this state interest is sufficient to justify the deviations at issue here.” Id. at 791.
All cases reaffirming this state interest stem from these three cases, particularly Burns.
Notwithstanding this questionable precedent, there are good reasons to believe that avoiding
incumbent pairing may be a legitimate interest supporting limited population deviations or
limited departures from neutral districting criteria. These reasons are discussed below.
288
See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 440–41.
289
Bush, 517 U.S. at 964–65 (noting that “incumbency protection” is a legitimate state
goal in the “limited form of ‘avoiding contests between incumbents’” (brackets omitted)).
287
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The difference between “incumbency pairing prevention” and “incumbency advantage” is the difference between a claimed interest in drawing a district boundary
between two incumbents’ residences and a claimed interest in drawing a district
boundary around incumbents’ supporters, detractors, or challengers. When a state
gently nudges district boundaries (or slightly deviates from population equality) to
prevent the pairing of incumbents, it preserves the opportunity for voters in both districts to weigh the incumbents’ experience, legislative seniority, and community ties
against the promises and platforms offered by the electoral challengers. This renders
a neutral, public benefit to the voters in both districts with minimal impact on voters’
rights and electoral prerogatives.
However, when a state radically distorts district boundaries (or substantially or
inconsistently departs from population equality) to fence out challengers or fence
in supporters, the state is advancing a personal interest that cannot be proffered in
court to defend the deviations. By wrapping the incumbent’s residence in an electoral artifice, the state usurps voters’ rightful role in choosing which candidate to
elect and attempts to coronate a state-sanctioned winner instead. Moreover, convoluted and far-flung districts that substantially disregard neutral principles for “incumbency protection” purposes are inherently at odds with the “community relations”
interests supposedly underlying these districting decisions.
The imperative animating the promise of equal protection under the law has long
been that courts “reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn
in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose.”290 The very act of creating a “safe
seat” for a party or incumbent implicitly entails a deprivation of constitutional rights
through intentional vote dilution.291 This is not an act that can be considered reasonable in light of a purpose to advantage a particular party or particular candidate.292
290

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 154 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“A bipartisan gerrymander employs the same technique, and has the same effect on individual
voters, as does a partisan gerrymander. . . . Some groups within each party will lose any
chance to elect a representative who belongs to their party, because they have been assigned
to a district in which the opposing party holds an overwhelming advantage.”).
292
Justice O’Connor would disagree. See id. at 154–55 (“If this bipartisan arrangement
between two groups of self-interested legislators is constitutionally permissible, as I believe
and as the Court held in Gaffney, then—in terms of the rights of individuals—it should be
equally permissible for a legislative majority to employ the same means to pursue its own
interests over the opposition of the other party.”). But this is where Justice O’Connor’s
Bandemer analysis strays from the path provided by Gaffney. The distinction between
political gerrymandering for “political fairness” purposes and political gerrymandering for
“partisan advantage” purposes was central to the holding in that case. See Gaffney, 412 U.S.
at 754 (holding that “neither we nor the district courts have a constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan . . . because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political
strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough
sort of proportional representation”).
291
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In both cases, the state admits its intention to make the effective execution of the
electoral franchise more difficult for those voters who disagree with its own value
judgments. The legislature, as then configured, may believe that a Democrat—or
that Congressman Smith—would be better to represent a particular district, but these
are not “legitimate state interests” of the state qua state. Whatever may be the virtues
of a rule that protects the private political machinations of individual legislators
when the resulting legislation has objectively legitimate merits, is nondiscriminatory, and is defended by the state on that basis,293 those virtues vanish when the
legislation has openly discriminatory and illegitimate aims that the state proffers to
the court without shame or pretense.
Although the state has a compelling interest in organizing “fair and effective
elections” as well as a legitimate interest in “incumbent pairing prevention,” the
state does not have a legitimate interest in “partisan advantage” or “incumbency advantage.” The question, therefore, is not whether the state has engaged in “too much”
partisan gerrymandering for the purposes of electoral advantage; any gerrymandering undertaken for these purposes is constitutionally questionable.294 Rather, the
primary question is whether the state has used political considerations for constitutional ends, such as “political fairness” or “incumbency pairing prevention.”
C. The Pursuit of “One” Political Gerrymandering Claim
Finally, we are left with a question of proof. What must plaintiffs show in order
to prevail on a political gerrymandering claim? Sundry tests and standards have been
floated promising varying degrees of mathematical surety.295 Yet, a fundamental
issue plagues these novel tests: none possess any greater claim to precedential authority
or constitutional legitimacy than any other. Where in the Constitution or its wellestablished judicial constructions, for example, can we find definitive authority for
the use of a “symmetry” standard or an “efficiency gap” standard?296 Can it be said
293

See generally Gaffney, 412 U.S. 735.
As discussed below, some questions of degree are raised in the process of evaluating
whether a claim of partisan gerrymandering will ultimately succeed, but these questions are
identical to those raised in racial gerrymandering cases. See infra notes 332–35, 350–51.
Here, the question is whether any degree of “electoral advantage,” taken alone, constitutes
a legitimate state interest. The answer is no.
295
See, e.g., Mem. of Amici Curiae Common Cause and New Virginia Majority Regarding
Proposed Remedial Plans, Personhuballah v. Alcorn, No. 3:13-CV-678 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12,
2015) (proposing “equal vote weight” standard for evaluating political gerrymandering claims).
296
It should be noted that many proposed political gerrymandering tests aim to follow the
breadcrumbs left by Justice Kennedy in Vieth and to measure the degree of burden placed
upon First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 456 (2015)
(discussing political gerrymandering claim based on Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that “the
First Amendment may offer a sounder and more prudential basis for intervention than does
the Equal Protection Clause” (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 315 (2004) (Kennedy,
J., concurring))). This Article declines to take a First Amendment route.
294
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that any model’s specific kind of injury—as defined by its particular mathematical
threshold—has always marked the constitutional bounds of political gerrymandering? And, if not, what must be proven? And how?
This leads us to the most important false premise that must be discarded for a
political gerrymandering claim to succeed. And that is the Court’s fruitless search
for “a” political gerrymandering claim. When one traces the evolution of gerrymandering, this fatal flaw becomes clear: there is no singular gerrymandering offense.
There are two: dilution and sorting.
Returning to the roots of the political gerrymandering claim and respecting its
shared lineage with racial gerrymandering jurisprudence (beginning with Fortson
v. Dorsey),297 we find that political vote dilution and political sorting are two different
gerrymandering offenses raising two separate constitutional concerns. Just as the
scope of the racial sorting claim should not be widened so far as to force it into
constitutional double-duty with the racial vote dilution claim, neither should the
Court have ever sought to have addressed both of these political gerrymandering
offenses under the singular umbrella of a “political gerrymandering” claim.
Disrupting this faulty premise also rehabilitates the precedential force of Bandemer
by combining the principal opinion and Justice Powell’s opinion into an effective
“majority” holding.298 Rather than marking a departure from the Court’s historical
treatment of racial gerrymandering claims, Bandemer can be read as presaging the
Court’s future treatment of racial gerrymandering claims. The Bandemer plurality
cited the Court’s racial vote dilution cases for the argument that an intent-plus-effect
test should apply and stated, “[T]he principles developed in these cases would apply
equally to claims by political groups in individual districts.”299 This is precisely the
standard that should prevail in a political vote dilution claim.
Meanwhile, Justice Powell’s opinion, though seemingly accepting the “common
practice of the party in power to choose the redistricting plan that gives it an advantage at the polls,” was quick to decry “‘the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes,”300 noting
that “district lines should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate
criteria,” and that “the State should treat its voters as standing in the same position,
regardless of their political beliefs or party affiliation” “[w]hen deciding where
[district] lines will fall.”301 Among the relevant evidentiary factors for making this
determination, Justice Powell included “the shapes of voting districts,” “adherence
297

379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (suggesting that racial and political vote dilution may state
a claim under the Equal Protection Clause).
298
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (plurality opinion); id. at 161 (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
299
Id. at 127, 131 n.12 (plurality opinion).
300
Id. at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Kirkpatrick
v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
301
Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
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to established political subdivision boundaries,” and “legislative history reflecting
contemporaneous legislative goals.”302 This proposal prophesies the emergence of
the political sorting standard.
In other words, courts should follow both the plurality opinion and Justice
Powell’s opinion in Bandemer and recognize that political vote dilution and political
sorting present equally valid and equally justiciable political gerrymandering claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather than viewing Bandemer as a fractured
holding with no precedential authority, we should view Bandemer as a collectively
vindicated majority holding endorsing both dilution and sorting claims and maintaining the seminal link between racial and political gerrymandering claims.303
This approach also reconciles Justice Kennedy’s diverging political gerrymandering “requirements.” In LULAC, Justice Kennedy argued that any claim of partisan
gerrymandering must “show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on the
complainants’ representational rights.”304 In Vieth, however, Justice Kennedy observed,
“If a State passed an enactment that declared ‘All future apportionment shall be
drawn so as most to burden Party X’s rights to fair and effective representation,
though still in accord with one-person, one-vote principles,’ we would surely conclude the Constitution had been violated.”305
These two postulated constraints are inconsistent only if one operates from the
misplaced premise that there can be only one political gerrymandering claim. If the
claim is split between political vote dilution and political sorting, however, these two
requirements are equally valid. In order to prove a political dilution claim, plaintiffs
302

Id. at 173 (footnote omitted).
The Court’s multifarious suggestions notwithstanding. See generally LULAC, 548 U.S.
399 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). Some courts have
claimed that Vieth “rejected” both an intent-plus-effect equal protection test as well as a
Shaw-like equal protection test. See, e.g., Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11CV-04884, 2011 WL 5868225, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2011). This seems misguided.
First, the Vieth Court—like the Bandemer Court—was still split on what “the” test for
political gerrymandering was. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284–85 (plurality opinion). This Article
rejects the misplaced premise that there is one singular gerrymandering claim rather than
two. Accepting that political gerrymandering, like racial gerrymandering, can come in two
equally impermissible flavors based on two different analytical foundations and be resolved
by two fundamentally different tests, there is no sound reason why both Bandemer opinions
cannot be correct.
Second, the idea that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Vieth managed to upend the
precedential effect of Bandemer is, at best, a questionable proposition. See Radogno, 2011
WL 5868225, at *2 n.2 (stating that Kennedy in his Vieth concurrence agreed no standard had
been met). As Professor Daniel Lowenstein has eloquently put it, “[s]omething cannot be replaced by nothing.” Daniel H. Lowenstein, Vieth’s Gap: Has the Supreme Court Gone from
Bad to Worse on Partisan Gerrymandering?, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 393 (2005).
304
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 418.
305
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 312 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
303
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must “show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on the complainants’ representational rights.”306 In order to prove a political sorting claim, however, plaintiffs
need only show that the legislature’s use of a political criterion subordinated other
districting criteria.307 This is tantamount to a facial classification—like the one hypothesized by Justice Kennedy in Vieth308—and places the burden upon the state to
justify its use of partisan districting. Because “political advantage” does not state a
legitimate state interest, such districting fails to clear the hurdle posed by even the
most deferential standard of review: rational basis review.
With these three conceptual snares removed, clearing the political thicket becomes a readily understandable and manageable task. Relying upon the standards
that have evolved in both racial vote dilution and racial sorting case law, we can
now coherently develop our political gerrymandering claims and understand the
proof necessary to prosecute such claims.
III. CLEARING THE PATH
Like racial gerrymandering, there are two different claims available for political
gerrymandering plaintiffs to pursue. For a political sorting claim, plaintiffs from the
gerrymandered district must prove that political affiliation or preference was the
predominant districting criterion employed insofar as it subordinated all other
neutral and non-political districting criteria in the formation of the district.309 Where
this is proven, the facially neutral legislation is treated as the legal equivalent of a
facial classification, and the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that its use of
the political criterion was sufficiently tailored to an adequate state interest.310
For a political vote dilution claim, plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent
and discriminatory effect.311 Proving discriminatory effect requires plaintiffs to satisfy
a set of modified Gingles prerequisites and then prove that the minority party voter
was deprived of equal political opportunity under the totality of circumstances.312

306

LULAC, 548 U.S. at 418.
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
308
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 312 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that a statute expressly
classifying by party would violate the Constitution).
309
See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (“[A] plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated
traditional [party]-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared
interests, to [political] considerations.”).
310
See id. (explaining how a state may defeat a sorting claim).
311
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (plurality opinion).
312
See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011–12 (noting that Gingles showing is
necessary, but not sufficient, to prevail on a claim of vote dilution, which is adjudged under
the totality of circumstances).
307
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Plaintiffs may introduce any number of mathematical theories or proofs to help bolster
a showing of discriminatory effect under the totality of circumstances inquiry, but
none of these methods is determinative per se.313
In either instance, the state may rebut a claim of localized political vote dilution or
political sorting by demonstrating that its political gerrymandering advanced a statewide
interest in political fairness, whether in the form of “partisan balance,” “competitive districts,” or any other reasonable articulation of “fair and effective representation.”314
A. Fourteenth Amendment Political Sorting
The theory of expressive and representational harm in a political sorting claim
arises from the state’s unjustifiable facial classification of voters on the basis of their
political opinions, affiliations, and preferences. The constitutional rule established
in the Shaw-Miller line of cases was not grounded on whether a gerrymander impedes a minority voter’s ability to elect a candidate of choice.315 On the contrary, the
decision enforced the outer permissible bounds of an undoubtedly compelling interest
in avoiding racial vote dilution.316 The offense was not that minority voters in those
districts were disenfranchised, but that they were sorted between districts on the
basis of a suspect classification alone and that this classification was evident on the
face of the law.317 In other words, the constitutional offense was in the predominant
and facially evident use of this classification.318
The expressive and representational harms discussed by Shaw appear prescient
when applied in the political context. With respect to expressive harm, it appears
quite possible that partisan gerrymandering has contributed to an increasingly volatile political culture: “Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of [their political
beliefs] ‘are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality.’ They threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of
their [political beliefs] and to incite [partisan] hostility.”319 The representational harms
of political sorting, and their consequences for a properly functioning representative
democracy, appear even more compelling:
313

See id. at 1000 (noting that a showing of proportionality is relevant to, but not dispositive of, whether members of a minority group have equal political opportunity).
314
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 976 (1996) (stating racial classifications in gerrymandering must be analyzed to determine whether there is a sufficient state interest furthered
by their use).
315
See Miller, 515 U.S. at 911 (noting that a Shaw claim is “analytically distinct” from
a claim of vote dilution).
316
See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 650–51 (1993) (noting that racial classifications receive
strict scrutiny even when employed to “benefit the races equally”).
317
Id. at 642.
318
Id.
319
Id. at 643 (citations omitted).

1152

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:1107

The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. When a district obviously is created
solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one [political] group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their
primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group,
rather than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy.320
And, as with racial gerrymandering:
[T]he harms that underlie a [political sorting] claim . . . are personal. They include being “personally . . . subjected to [a] . . .
classification,” as well as being represented by a legislator who
believes his “primary obligation is to represent only the members” of a particular . . . group. They directly threaten a voter
who lives in the district attacked.321
Political gerrymandering, no less than racial gerrymandering, “strikes at the heart
of our democratic process, undermining the electorate’s confidence in its government as representative of a cohesive body politic in which all citizens are equal
before the law.”322 Unlike in a vote dilution claim, however, plaintiffs are not required in a sorting claim to provide evidence that the representational harms postulated have come to pass.323 That is because the state bears the burden of justifying
facial classifications.324
As with race, the mere awareness or consideration of voters’ political affiliation
by legislators is both unavoidable and constitutionally acceptable. As the Gaffney
Court observed:
It would be idle, we think, to contend that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is
sufficient to invalidate it. . . . The very essence of districting is to
produce a different—a more “politically fair”—result . . . . Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting
and apportionment.325
320

Id. at 648.
Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2015) (second and
third alterations in original) (citations omitted).
322
Id. at 1275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
323
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (holding that plaintiffs must show subordination of race-neutral principles to state a sorting claim).
324
Id.
325
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752–53 (1973).
321
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Legislators will always possess a range of motivations for their votes. And, districting on the basis of political affiliation may—in some circumstances—be a legitimate
criterion for the legislature to overtly employ as well. Again, as with race, there is
nothing inherently “permissible” or “impermissible” about the overt use of demographic information during the districting process. The “permissibility” of such a
criterion is a function of whether or not the use of the classification passes muster
under the applicable standard.326 Although a facial political classification may be
inherently less suspect than a facial racial classification, the degree of “suspect-ness”
determines which standard applies; it does not foreclose the classification’s use
altogether.327 A racial, like a political, classification may be employed by the State
for a constitutionally permissible purpose.328
Therefore, when political affiliation or preference becomes the predominate
basis upon which district lines are drawn, that is tantamount to a facial classification
under the Fourteenth Amendment demanding adequate justification. This is blackletter equal protection jurisprudence for any facial classification.329 I would suggest
that classifications in the redistricting context must pass heightened scrutiny, but if
the proffered justification is “political advantage,” then the districting would not survive any degree of scrutiny, including rational basis review.330
326

Miller, 515 U.S. at 920 (citing Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 653–57 (1993)).
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004) (plurality opinion).
328
See Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1995).
329
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so
long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”).
330
The Court has held that discriminatory facial classifications employing party affiliation
are not “subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny” as race, Shaw I, 509 U.S. at
650 (emphasis added), but the Court has assiduously avoided stating whether political affiliation is a suspect classification, see, e.g., id. This Article demonstrates that gerrymandering
for partisan advantage based predominantly on political criteria cannot even satisfy rational
basis review, but this might not be the most appropriate standard of review.
Although the principal opinion in Bush expressly stated that classifications by political
preference should not be subjected to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, 517
U.S. 952, 964 (1996) (principal opinion), this is a question that a majority of the Supreme
Court has never specifically answered. Early Court precedents included “political affiliation”
among the list of classifications that have since been deemed “suspect” on the basis that such
classifications “would be pure favoritism, and a denial of the equal protection of the laws to
the less favored classes.” Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900). And, at
least one circuit court appears to agree that political affiliation is a suspect classification. See
Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 938 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment most typically reaches state action that treats a person poorly because of the person’s race or other suspect classification, such as sex, national origin, religion, political affiliation, among others, or because the person has exercised a ‘fundamental
right,’ or because the person is a member of a group that is the target of irrational government
discrimination.” (emphasis added)), cert denied, 562 U.S. 1288 (2011); see also Allbritton
v. Village of Dolton, No. 10C7581, 2012 WL 10516, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2012).
327
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Yet, a Fourteenth Amendment political sorting claim is not merely limited to the
crafting of “partisan” districts. “Incumbency considerations” may cause deviations
from neutral districting criteria as well. And, just like race and political affiliation,
incumbency considerations have permissible and impermissible purposes. Legislators may not district predominantly on the basis of “incumbency protection” if that
“protection” comes in the form of suppression or advantage rather than “incumbency pairing prevention.”
As discussed above, the subordination of neutral principles in order to classify
voters based on their political opinions or preferences may give rise to a claim of
political sorting. This remains true if the political preference is for an identified
candidate, or even if the facial classification is by individual.331 For example, district
boundaries that substantially disregard neutral principles in order to snatch a specific
primary challenger out of one district and place her in another district require a
legitimate state justification under the Equal Protection Clause. In short, when discriminatory districting criteria predominate over neutral districting criteria, plaintiffs
may maintain a sorting claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.332
The Court need not hold that political affiliation is a “suspect” classification, however,
in order to apply heightened scrutiny to such classifications in the redistricting context. The
Court could also apply—and I would recommend applying—heightened scrutiny in this context
based on the Court’s “precedents involving discriminatory restructuring of governmental
decisionmaking.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 625. In Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, for
example, the Court stated,
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given “rational”
classifications in other types of enactments are based on an assumption
that the institutions of state government are structured so as to represent
fairly all the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in
effect a challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer
serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality.
395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969) (footnote omitted). Because a constitutional challenge to redistricting
legislation challenges the “assumption that the institutions of state government are structured
so as to represent fairly all the people,” a facial classification here should be subjected to
heightened scrutiny regardless of the type of classification employed, be it racial, political,
or even religious. Id. This, perhaps, is a more analytically consistent and enduring approach
to sorting claims.
331
See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601–02 (2008) (noting that a plaintiff can make an equal protection claim based on being singled out as a “class of one”).
332
It should be noted at this juncture that if a plaintiff brings a claim of racial sorting and
a claim of political sorting, then the state should be estopped from arguing that a district has
been constructed predominantly on the basis of discriminatory criteria—such as race, politics, and incumbency—but that the plaintiff has failed to prove which discriminatory basis
actually predominated. If the plaintiff brings both claims, the state cannot argue that a district
is predominantly both and therefore predominantly neither. Of course, if a plaintiff brings
only a racial sorting claim and then fails to show that race subordinated all other criteria, then
the plaintiff’s claim must fail. See Personhuballah v. Alcorn, No. 3:13CV678, 2016 WL
93849, at *10 n.13 (E.D. Va. Jan. 7, 2016) (Payne, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“It is one thing to find . . . that race was not shown to be the predominate reason for
drawing the district; and, therefore, that the Plaintiffs did not prove the only theory of the
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Of course, the predominance inquiry does raise a question regarding the “degree” of the gerrymander in some regards. However, this “how much” question is
not particularly unique. Courts routinely grapple with ascertaining predominance in
racial sorting cases, and the Court’s holding in Cromartie II implicitly recognizes
that political predominance is a readily identifiable phenomenon.333
In short, although the state has a compelling interest in organizing “fair and effective elections,” as well as a legitimate interest in “incumbent pairing prevention,”
the state does not have a legitimate interest in “partisan advantage” or “incumbency
advantage.”334 If the state can demonstrate that its predominant political sorting furthers
an interest in “political fairness” or “incumbent pairing prevention,” then the districting plan should survive. As part of this demonstration, the state may defeat a claim
of political gerrymandering in a particular challenged district by showing that it was
attempting to provide proportional electoral opportunities, competitive districts, or
any other such neutral, democratic interest on a statewide basis.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Political Vote Dilution
Political gerrymandering may also cause constitutional harm by burdening the free
and effective exercise of the electoral franchise through intentional vote dilution and
the invidious minimization of equal electoral opportunity based on political identity.
This theory of harm is the one most frequently envisioned in political gerrymandering opinions.
But although this theory of harm is perhaps more immediately relatable, it is
also more difficult to demonstrate. That is not because political vote dilution should
be subject to any higher threshold of evidence than racial vote dilution, but rather
because “the elements necessary to a successful vote dilution claim may be more
difficult to prove in relation to a claim by a political group.”335 As the Bandemer Court
stated, “the principles developed in [racial vote dilution] cases . . . apply equally to
claims by political groups in individual districts.”336
The reason political and racial vote dilution should be adjudged under the same
legal standard is twofold. First, the Court historically defined the concepts of political
and racial vote dilution in the same breath. This common lineage only began to split
in Bandemer, and the plurality opinion in Bandemer itself said that the standards were
the same.337 This was validated by the Bolden-Rogers line of cases, which affirmed that
constitutional race dilution claims are also subject to an intent-plus-effect test.338
case which they presented. On the merits, the Plaintiffs did not assert the alternate theory that
the Enacted Plan was an unconstitutional political gerrymander, and it would have been
improper for the Court to have decided the case on a theory neither raised nor tried.”).
333
See generally Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
334
See supra Part II.A.
335
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131 n.12 (1986) (plurality opinion).
336
Id.
337
See id.
338
See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 621–22 (1982) (establishing intent as a necessary
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Second, the Court has developed a set of manageable legal standards for ascertaining the presence of impermissible vote dilution in the Section 2 context under
Gingles.339 By utilizing a modified set of Gingles prerequisites and then allowing for
judicial balancing under the totality of circumstances test, courts would have a
ready-made standard to apply to claims of intentional political vote dilution. Providing sufficient evidence to survive this legal standard in the political context may be
more difficult, but that does not mean that the standard itself should be different.
The false premise that the standard for political vote dilution should be more
difficult is arguably the initial logical flaw that caused this doctrine to wander in the
wilderness for so long. But government discrimination based on one’s beliefs—
especially in the political arena—receives just as much constitutional scrutiny as
discrimination on the basis of race: the strongest form of strict scrutiny.
Therefore, political vote dilution claims—just like constitutional racial vote dilution
claims—should be adjudicated under the Bolden-Rogers line of cases and should be
subject to an equivalent intent-plus-effect standard. Rogers itself implies as much.340
Under Gingles, a “majority must usually be able to defeat” minority-preferred candidates.341 “In both contexts,” however, the ultimate “question is whether a particular
group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the
political process.”342 Although there is no statutory “political section 2,” the standards developed in Gingles should be applied as prerequisites to any political vote
dilution claim since the statutory language is drawn from the constitutional vote dilution cases themselves.343
To adjudicate a political vote dilution claim, plaintiffs would possess district-bydistrict standing and allege that the legislature acted with discriminatory intent to
pack, stack, or crack voters by political affiliation in order to dilute their equal electoral
opportunities.344 As a prerequisite, plaintiffs would need to satisfy a modified Gingles
test. First, they would be required to show that they constitute a geographically
element for a constitutional claim of race dilution); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66–68
(1980) (same).
339
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48–51 (1985) (articulating the three-part
Gingles test).
340
See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 616 (noting that, absent discriminatory intent, districting schemes
are not unconstitutional just because they may cause a “distinct minority, whether it be a
racial, ethnic, economic, or political group” to be unable to elect their chosen representatives
(emphasis added)).
341
See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 49.
342
See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132–33 (plurality opinion).
343
See Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
344
See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 670 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that “gerrymanders
come in various shades,” such as at-large voting schemes; “cracking” (“the fragmentation of a
minority group among various districts ‘so that it is a majority in none’”); “stacking” (placing
“a large minority population concentration . . . with a larger [majority] population”) (first
alteration in original); and “packing” (“the ‘concentration of [minority voters] into districts
where they constitute an excessive majority’”) (alteration in original)).
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compact numerical majority in a hypothetical district. For members of a major party,
this will normally be quite simple. Next, they would need to show that voting in the
region is politically polarized (i.e., that the group is politically cohesive and that
bloc voting by the majority usually enables that majority to defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate). This prerequisite will be more difficult to prove. The presence
of sufficient crossover—or, more importantly, “coalition”—voting may be sufficient
to defeat a claim of political vote dilution at the prerequisites stage. If non-affiliated
or independent voters move between party candidates in sufficient and frequent
numbers, for example, the plaintiffs would be unable to show that their ability to
elect has been effectively submerged.
Of course, a political minority may lose elections repeatedly because the majority
rationally disagrees with its political opinion. That is the nature of democracy.
However, the whole point of a vote dilution claim is that the majority in that district
is an unconstitutionally constituted majority. The inquiry into political polarization
is not to show that voters “invidiously” discriminated on the basis of political affiliation. Such an inquiry is absurd. Deciding between competing political visions is the
purpose of a democratic electoral device.345 A finding of political polarization is
neither an evil to be avoided nor a good to be sought; it is just an amoral prerequisite
to a finding of dilutive effect. The final inquiry is on whether the legislature intentionally installed or maintained the districting scheme in order to dilute electoral
opportunities for voters in the political minority in that district.
Because political polarization is more likely to fluctuate than racial polarization,
many political vote dilution claims will founder at the prerequisites stage based on
a failure to demonstrate sufficiently durable polarization. To the extent functional
voting analyses reflect a sizable centrist or unaffiliated voting contingency willing
to vote for minority-preferred candidates, the meaningful presence of swing voters
will undermine a claim of dilutive effect. Similarly, a temporal spike in polarization
is far less likely to be legally significant than a showing of enduring, intense polarization because this is likely to reflect the presence of a particularly sharp issue in
an election rather than a dilutive device. It is incumbent upon the courts to weigh
these factors and determine whether a political group is sufficiently compact and
whether voting is sufficiently polarized in order to advance to the next stage of the
inquiry. There is not yet a simple doctrinal test for the existence of legally significant political bloc voting.346
The role of functional analyses will be particularly important in order to avoid
undue reliance on electoral results themselves. This is arguably part of the reason
345

Politics is the assigned battleground for the resolution of competing democratic claims.
Political parties—unlike racial characteristics—are intended to serve as the legitimate rallying
posts for political disagreement. Thus, polarization of voting by party is an amoral fact. Polarization may wax and wane based on public opinion, party position, and the merits or foibles
of individual candidates.
346
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 58.
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why the Bandemer Court struggled so mightily to determine how political vote
dilution should be measured. In Bandemer, a “multitude of conflicting statistical
evidence was . . . introduced at the trial” before the district court.347 “The District
Court, however, specifically declined to credit any of this evidence, noting that it did
not ‘wish to choose which statistician is more credible or less credible.’”348 But,
statistical evidence is precisely the kind of vital information that courts rely upon
today in ascertaining the presence of racial vote dilution. Such evidence should be
welcomed, rather than dismissed, in political vote dilution claims because electoral
results themselves are a confluence of many interwoven variables, including the
personal merits of the candidates, the pressing issues of the day, and the platforms
offered by the parties.
If a court finds the Gingles prerequisites satisfied, it should then evaluate the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether there is sufficient evidence for a
finding of both discriminatory intent and dilutive effect. Those claims that do manage
to survive the Gingles prerequisites analysis are likely to encounter even greater difficulties of proof in presenting sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent and effect
to support an actionable claim. Several of the factors examined by courts in racial
vote dilution claims will be inapplicable in the political vote dilution context.349 Other
factors, however, may provide for a more fruitful inquiry.
These “other factors” may include legislative history, contemporaneous statements, proportionality, “symmetry,” “efficiency,” “equal vote weight,” or any other
number of metrics that have been proposed to help “show a burden, as measured by
a reliable standard, on the complainants’ representational rights.”350 None of these
347

Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 116 n.3 (plurality opinion).
Id. (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (S.D. Ind. 1984)).
349
See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 206–07
(providing a non-exhaustive list, including “1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. the
extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or
procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have
been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the
state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in
the jurisdiction . . . [; 8.] whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of
elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group[; 9.] whether
the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous” (footnotes omitted)).
350
LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 418 (2006). Several of these measures may be gauged at the
statewide level. Although the plaintiff must make a showing of intentional vote dilution in
348
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indicators, taken alone, provides a dispositive metric for finding unconstitutional
political vote dilution. Each, however, is a factor that a court conducting a totality
of circumstances inquiry can consider in determining the presence of both discriminatory intent and dilutive political effect. Assuming that the plaintiff satisfies a
modified Gingles analysis, any additional evidence contributes to the court’s overarching totality of circumstances analysis.
Of course, this inquiry does raise a question of degree, or “how much is too
much.” But, once we have identified the true locus and scope of the “degree” question,
it becomes far less treacherous to navigate. As with the predominance inquiry in a
sorting claim, the question of “how much dilutive impact is required” to prevail on
a dilution claim is a rather routine one. Although courts facing racial vote dilution
claims (in the constitutional or statutory context) must grapple with tough questions
and make difficult judgment calls, that does not mean the question itself is irresolvable or nonjusticiable. It is clear that a mere change—upward or downward—in
minority ability to elect is insufficient to show unlawful discriminatory effect. This
has never been—and could not practicably be—the standard in either the racial or
political dilution context. Ascertaining an actionable level of dilution in the racial
or political context is more art than science. But just as the Court is not afraid to
eschew bright lines in the racial dilution context, the Court should not be afraid to
embrace difficult judgments in the political dilution context.351
If the totality of circumstances reveals that a political majority has intentionally
diminished the ability of a political minority to effectively participate in the political
process and elect its representative of choice in that district, then a political vote
dilution claim may succeed. Of course, if the state can demonstrate that the dilutive
burden upon the individual’s right to vote in that district was tailored to a compelling government interest, such as providing for proportional electoral opportunities
or competitive districts on a statewide basis, then the state may be able to defeat even
a successful showing of localized political vote dilution.352
her specific district, there is nothing preventing the plaintiff from introducing statewide evidence to help advance her claim.
351
For example, although there is no independent right to proportional representation, a
showing of proportionality is a “relevant”—but not “dispositive”—fact “in the totality of circumstances to be analyzed when determining whether members of a minority group have ‘less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.’” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994) (quoting the
former 42 U.S.C. § 1973). Similarly, so long as states employ single-member districts with
first-past-the-post voting methods, there can be no guarantee that a majority of votes in a state
will translate into a majority of seats in the legislature. However, despite the absence of any
independent right to this particular definition of “majority rule,” any analysis showing that
a majority of votes will usually fail to result in a majority of seats would be “relevant”—but
not “dispositive”—evidence that members of a particular party lack equal political opportunity.
352
This may not be the case if a third-party voter successfully demonstrates the existence
of intentional political vote dilution. The two major parties could not split the entire state to
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C. Re-examining the Vieth Arguments
Having evaluated the legal and analytical justifications for examining political
vote dilution and political sorting separately, it now becomes imperative to gauge
whether the two standards hold up to the concerns raised above.
1. Race is an “impermissible” factor to consider in drawing legislative districts,
whereas political affiliation is a “permissible” factor to consider.353
Based on the analysis above, neither of these premises is true. The Court has
recognized that considerations of race do not, taken alone, render legislation unconstitutional, but that when race predominates, it is an impermissible factor unless justified by a compelling interest. Race could be a permissible factor to comply with
federal antidiscrimination law, for example, while simultaneously being an impermissible factor to advance a legislator’s “interest” in “racial advantage.” Similarly,
the approach above recognizes that considerations of political affiliation do not,
taken alone, render legislation unconstitutional, but when political affiliation predominates in the sorting process, it is an impermissible factor unless justified by a
sufficiently weighty state interest. Thus, Gaffney’s observation that politics in districting
is inevitable remains true, but does not sanction sorting voters predominantly on the
basis of political preference absent a cognizable interest in “political fairness.”354
Reading Gaffney otherwise conflates legislators’ personal districting considerations
with the State’s legitimate districting interests.
2. Race is an immutable characteristic, whereas political affiliation is not.355
It is true that political opinion is not an immutable characteristic, but it is also irrelevant. As the Bandemer Court observed, the immutability of the characteristic
does not bear on the justiciability of the claim.356 “That the characteristics of the complaining group are not immutable or that the group has not been subject to the same
historical stigma may be relevant to the manner in which the case is adjudicated, but
these differences do not justify a refusal to entertain such a case.”357 The mutability of
political affiliation may make the plaintiffs’ evidence more complex, but it does not
reflect “partisan balance” between those two parties if it simultaneously entailed diluting the
vote of third-party voters. Third-party voters, however, are likely to founder on the modified
Gingles prerequisites’ first prong: showing that there are enough third-party voters to form
a numerical majority in a compact hypothetical district.
353
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004) (plurality opinion).
354
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973).
355
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287 (plurality opinion).
356
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986) (plurality opinion).
357
Id.
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make the case nonjusticiable or mean the case should be subjected to a higher
threshold showing.
While “public opinion” on discrete issues may sway on a daily basis and individuals’ opinions do change subtly over time, political identities are rarely subject to
constant and unpredictable fluctuation. As Justice Stevens observed in Vieth: “The
plurality asserts that a person’s politics, unlike her race, is not readily ‘discernible.’
But that assertion is belied by the evidence that the architects of political gerrymanders seem to have no difficulty in discerning the voters’ political affiliation.”358 This
task of discerning political affiliation has grown—and will continue to grow—even
simpler as increasingly fine-tuned data sets paint a startlingly detailed picture of the
individual and his or her likely political affiliation or preference. A single look at
some states’ bizarre and detailed maps should dispel any notion that gauging political affiliation is an “impossible” enterprise.
Moreover, the fact that the population’s characteristics, demographics, and identities shift over time is the sole reason for redistricting. The Court would not let an
OPOV violation go unchecked upon the basis that residence is a “mutable” characteristic, despite the fact that voters are regularly moving between districts and between
states, lending an air of unpredictability to the districting exercise. As the Karcher
Court stated, “the well-known restlessness of the American people means that population counts for particular localities are outdated long before they are completed.”359
In short, the objection that a political gerrymandering claim is unmanageable or
unwieldy because political preference is “mutable” is a weak one. This is especially
so following the Supreme Court’s holding in Cromartie II, wherein districting upon
the basis of political affiliation was found to predominate over other districting criteria.
This holding rests entirely upon the assumption that political gerrymandering is both
feasible and readily identifiable.
3. Political gerrymandering claims do not provide manageable and administrable
standards.360
This objection proceeds more by ipse dixit than argument. As the Bandemer
Court indicated, there is little reason to believe that political vote dilution standards
“are less manageable than the standards that have been developed for racial [vote
dilution] claims.”361 This is especially true now that clearer standards and precedents
have developed within the racial vote dilution case law based on the Gingles prerequisites. The fact that these same standards may be harder to satisfy in the political
358

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 338 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983).
360
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion) (noting that there are no “judicially discernable
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context does not mean they are any less manageable. Plaintiffs very well may fail
to prove an actionable level of political dilution as consistently as they succeed in
proving political sorting. A string of failures on the “judgment score card”—like a
string of successes—says less about whether the standard is “manageable” and more
about how difficult the standard is to meet and whether the legislature has or has not
engaged in the prohibited behavior.
The standards are also equally justifiable in the political context. In Vieth, Justice
Scalia juxtaposed a “constitutional command” to “refrain from racial discrimination”
with an “inference” not to apply “too much partisanship.”362 But the primary question
under the Equal Protection Clause is not whether partisan advantage went too far,
just as the primary question under the Equal Protection Clause is not whether racial
advantage went too far. The initial inquiry is one of type, not degree.
In a discriminatory sorting claim—of the racial or political variety—the only
question of degree is whether the discriminatory criterion “predominated.” If so,
then this is tantamount to a facial classification and the state bears the burden of
showing that its racial or political districting was sufficiently tailored to attain a constitutional goal. Sheer racial or political advantage, taken alone, is not a legitimate
state interest in any degree.
In a discriminatory dilution claim—of the racial or political variety—the intent
to benefit one race or party is, taken alone, not a legitimate interest. If this intent can
be proven, then the only question of degree is whether the discriminatory effect is
sufficient to be actionable. If the state intentionally packed or cracked an identifiable
group of voters that could have constituted a numerical majority in a compact hypothetical district in order to dilute their equal opportunity to elect a candidate of their
choice and the record reflects that this effort, in fact, succeeded in denying equal
electoral opportunity, then a quite routine and traditional Equal Protection Clause
claim grounded in discriminatory intent and effect will have been established. Both
of these approaches reflect black-letter Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Neither
involves fuzzy inferences.
4. Political gerrymandering claims require courts to determine what political systems
and theories are “fair.”363
The approaches outlined above leave legislatures in control of determining
proper district boundaries, crafting districts that embrace particular political cultures,
and deciding what form of democratic vision to advance, whether it be more stable
and partisan or more competitive and centrist. What the claims above do require is
that the state at least put forth a colorable argument that its use of discriminatory
districting enhances democratic values and fair and effective representation. The
claims do not impose a particular version of “fairness” upon the state; instead, they
362
363

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286 (plurality opinion).
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prevent unequal treatment under the law on the basis of political affiliation. When
the State aims to distort the impact of individual votes or classify voters on the basis
of their political beliefs, it is hardly an imposition to ask the state to explain its own
view of “fairness” to the Court. If the state can make a reasonable argument why its
actions advance some theory of electoral fairness or effective representation, then
its articulation of fairness should prevail. At present, however, many states do not
even pretend to advance such a theory or vision.
5. Consideration of political factors is “inevitable” in the legislative districting
process.364
The approach outlined herein does not pretend that legislators will cease considering the consequences of various districting plans, whether on racial or political
groups or on incumbents’ opportunities for reelection. As with any legislation, it
would be a fool’s errand to attempt to remove the politics from politics. However,
the Gaffney Court clearly expressed its willingness to defend against unconstitutional
incursions upon the Fourteenth Amendment.365 All laws are inevitably “political,”
but courts review their constitutionality all the same. When racial or political classifications predominate in a redistricting plan or when plaintiffs make a threshold
showing of political vote dilution under a modified Gingles analysis, the state passes
the point of “politics as usual” and is no longer entitled to judicial deference.
6. Political gerrymandering claims are grounded in a presumed right to proportional
representation, which the Constitution does not provide.366
One might have presumed this persistent red herring was officially cast back out
to sea in 1973 with the Court’s decision in Regester.367 There is no constitutional right
to political proportional representation just as there is no right to racial proportional representation.368 There is, however, a constitutional right to the fair and effective exercise of the electoral enterprise. So long as the judiciary ensures that the legislature
does not intentionally diminish voters’ electoral opportunities or facially classify voters
for illegitimate purposes, then the judiciary has no further role to play. The fact that one
party prevails over another in any given election is the very essence of a democracy,
and the fact that the outcome is not proportional to the votes cast is an inherent function
364
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See id. at 765–66 (noting that, to sustain a claim of vote dilution, “it is not enough that
the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to
its voting potential”; rather, the plaintiffs must show that “the political processes . . . were
not equally open to participation by the group in question”).
365

1164

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:1107

of our country’s tradition of geographic representation and first-past-the-post elections.
So long as the legislature continues to employ single-member districts and a first-pastthe-post counting system, some degree of disproportionality is likely to result. If
neutral districting criteria predominate and the state has not intentionally diminished
an identifiable group’s equal political opportunities, then the Equal Protection Clause
demands no more. As such, neither a political vote dilution claim nor a political
sorting claim is “grounded in a presumed right to proportional representation.”369
In short, none of the arguments raised in Vieth offer a sound reason to reject a
dual-claim approach to political gerrymandering. The claims of dilution and sorting
provide familiar and readily administrable standards based on existing Supreme Court
precedent and grounded in well-established Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.
D. Legislative Practicum
Our extended detour through the Court’s districting case law may prove pedagogically useful, but legislators and their advisors may be left wondering in the final
analysis what they can and cannot do under the theory above. Although district
architects might find it prudent to engage outside counsel in order to navigate the
finer nuances of their drafting decisions, there would be at least two basic avenues
open to legislators who wish to reduce litigation risk in districting.
The “process-first” approach would be for legislators to craft plans that predominantly rely upon neutral districting criteria in determining where district boundaries
fall and then to verify that the enacted plan has limited dilutive impact. Neutral districting criteria are those that are “geography-based” (rather than “identity-based”)
and advance basic democratic interests, such as accountability, responsiveness, ease of
administration, etc. Examples of these neutral criteria include compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions and geographic boundaries. If an enacted
plan has districts that comply with equal population goals, substantially reflect
neutral districting principles, and avoid splitting areas wherein racial minorities
would possess an ability to elect a representative in a hypothetical, compact district,
then the plan is likely to satisfy the OPOV principle, meet the requirements of the VRA,
and avoid triggering predominance of identity-based criteria, such as politics or race.
To ensure that districts substantially reflect neutral districting principles while
still complying with OPOV and VRA requirements, districters might well aim to
“backstop” neutral principles with other neutral principles. For example, if it is
impossible to align district boundaries with political subdivisions and achieve equal
population goals, then a legislator might add relatively compact territory along precinct boundaries from an adjacent subdivision or might shift the boundary to align
with a natural geographic feature. Of course, for state legislative districts, population
equality is also a feature that can be more freely shifted in order to advance a neutral
and consistent state policy, such as respect for political subdivisions. Similarly,
369
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legislators are permitted to slightly deviate from equal population goals or neutral
districting principles in order to avoid pairing two incumbent members in the same
district, assuming this policy is pursued on a consistent—rather than a discriminatory or partisan—basis.
Among the various predominantly neutral proposals generated by the “processfirst” approach above, legislators will be unavoidably aware of which maps are
advantageous to the majority party and which maps are not. At this stage, legislators
in the majority are likely to enact a plan with promising electoral prospects for their
party. It is technically true that a map that predominantly reflects neutral districting
principles on its face still might be so dilutive of minority voting power in effect that
it creates an actionable claim for political vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, even assuming that the intent to enact an advantageous plan can be
proven, the dilutive effect would need to be especially acute for a federal court to
find, under the totality of circumstances, that voters in the minority party did not
have an equal political opportunity to elect their candidate of choice or influence the
political process. Regardless, legislators should be cognizant of this risk in determining which “substantially neutral” plan to enact.
Alternatively, legislators could employ a “purpose-first” approach to districting.
Under this approach, legislators establish a political goal up front and then tailor
their districting decisions to advance that model of representation, whether by intentionally creating highly competitive districts, safe seats in rough proportion to statewide
party voting strength, or any other reasonably “fair and effective” form of representation. These districts may flagrantly disregard neutral principles in order to advance
the political goal sought, but—as in Gaffney—the goal must be some form of political fairness, not raw political advantage. By predominantly districting on the
basis of political preference or affiliation, the enacted map will constitute a form of
facial political classification, but so long as the map is sufficiently tailored to an
adequate state interest, it will likely survive.
Of course, districts formed predominantly on the basis of political criteria must
also comply with the OPOV principle and the VRA. As to the latter, legislators must
still ensure that they do not split areas wherein racial minorities would possess an
ability to elect a representative in a hypothetical, compact district. Assuming legislators
avoid racial vote dilution and retrogression, however, it is highly unlikely that they
will need to be concerned about racial sorting under a “purpose-first” approach. This
is because political affiliation—not race—will almost certainly be considered the
predominate criterion employed in constructing the district in question.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court’s redistricting precedents are both confused and confusing. But by identifying and jettisoning the three false assumptions
woven throughout existing case law, the full weight and authority of those precedents becomes clear.
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First, the Court must distinguish between the amoral considerations of individual
legislators and the interests of the state itself. Legislators will always be conscious
of the racial, political, and incumbency ramifications of their districting decisions, but
this does not immunize the state from constitutional scrutiny if it attempts to substitute personal interests for public interests. The State cannot claim an interest in who
wins a democratic election.
Second, the Court must distinguish between the permissible and impermissible
uses of racial, political, and incumbency criteria. A state may constitutionally use
these criteria to advance interests in compliance with federal antidiscrimination law,
political fairness, or incumbency pairing prevention. A state may not use these criteria
simply to “advantage” one race over another, one party over another, or an incumbent over a challenger.
Finally, the Court must recognize that—like racial gerrymandering—there are
two types of political gerrymandering offense: political vote dilution and political
sorting. Racial and political gerrymandering claims share the same precedential lineage
and are prosecuted using the same methods of proof. These standards rest upon decades
of jurisprudential authority and are grounded in well-trod judicial constructions.
The consequence of this recognition would be the creation of a coherent and
comprehensive approach to political gerrymandering and a rehabilitation of the Court’s
historically unified treatment of racial and political gerrymandering claims. Because
political and racial gerrymandering claims share a common jurisprudential root, the
Court’s divergent treatment of racial and political claims, starting with Bandemer,370
should be viewed as an historical aberration. The failure of the Court to adjudicate
such analytically identical claims over the course of the past thirty years has had a
tragically predictable consequence: the nationwide deprivation of citizens’ equal
protection under the law due to discriminatory state treatment on the basis of political opinion, preference, and affiliation. This reflects a loophole at odds with history
and reason, and it should finally be closed.
Justice James Wilson—one of our nation’s founding fathers, a leading luminary
at the Constitutional Convention, and one of the first Justices nominated by President George Washington to the Supreme Court—once compared the British House
of Commons to the United States House of Representatives, writing:
With us, no preference is given to any party, any interest, any
situation, any profession, or any description over another. With
us, those votes, equally, freely, and universally diffused, will have
their frequent and powerful operation and influence. With us,
therefore, it may be expected, that the voice of the representatives will be the faithful echo of the voice of the people.371
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As one of the primary drafters of the Constitution and one of the first individuals
entrusted with its interpretation, Justice Wilson’s views might be entitled to more
authority than most.
Of course, the approach advanced above has the potential to result in widespread
litigation. This litigation could cast doubt upon the constitutional legitimacy of
legislative districts throughout the nation and have a profound effect upon the
composition of state legislatures and the United States House of Representatives.
The interpretation above is not proposed lightly or idly. In Reynolds v. Sims, the
Court observed, “the problem of state legislative malapportionment is one that is
perceived to exist in a large number of the States.”372 Yet, the Court held that the widespread and long-practiced nature of the violation did not thereby sanction its continuation. Rather, the Court’s answer was this: “[A] denial of constitutionally protected
rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us.”373
It is this author’s belief that political and racial sorting and political and racial
vote dilution are equally valid constitutional claims, and that legislatures engaging
in either practice have transgressed those rights protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Some would undoubtedly consider such a suggestion adventuresome.
The Supreme Court has offered precious little guidance in this area, save an occasional reminder that political gerrymandering may—in some circumstances—be
unconstitutional. But as Justice Stevens stated in Cox v. Larios, there will come a
time when the Court’s ambivalence in this field “will be replaced by stern condemnation of partisan gerrymandering that does not even pretend to be justified by
neutral principles.”374 That time is now. And, eventually, the only thing astonishing
about such claims may be that they did not prevail sooner.
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